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Abstract
This paper is part of a collaborative research project entitled The Role of Law and Legal
Institutions in Asian Economic Development (1960-95)sponsored by the Asian Development
Bank. The study included six Asian countries: People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan,China. Oxford University Press is publishing the
comparative report.
The key question addressed by this paper is whether law had a positive impact on economic
development in Korea. Following a methodology that was developed for all six country studies,
the authors divided the 35 years into major policy periods: the period of export-led growth
(1961-73); the Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive (HCID) (1973-79); consolidation,
stabilization, and a return to export-led growth (1980-85); and liberalization and globalization
(1985-95). The authors conclude that the impact of law differed from policy period to policy
period as well as between different areas of the law. In periods of strong state interference, such
as during the HCID, the role of law for economic development is much harder to detect than
during the subsequent consolidation and liberalization periods. Similarly, there is no clear
relationship between economic development and the role of legal institutions. Other variables,
including the political development of the country, have influenced the development of these
institutions and their relevance for economic agents.
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Executive Summary
Introduction
The following analysis “The Role of Law and Legal Institutions in Asian Economic
Development: The Case of Korea; Patterns of Change in the Legal System and Socio-Economy”
is part of a collaborative research project entitled “The Role of Law and Legal Institutions in
Asian Economic Development (1960-95)” which was sponsored by the Asian Development
Bank. The study included six Asian economies: People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan,China. The research was carried out by
interdisciplinary research teams consisting of at least one lawyer and one economist in each of
the six countries and based on research guidelines developed by a Harvard-based research team
in collaboration with the country teams.1 The comparative report that resulted from this study
was presented at a Symposium at the Asian Development Bank in Manila in September 1997 and
will be published by Oxford University Press.
The presentation and analysis in this essay closely follow the research guidelines. The essay
addresses a number of concepts developed in the guidelines as well as in the comparative report.
For a better understanding the following overview summarizes the conceptual framework used
for the comparative study.
Framework of Analysis Framework of Analysis
The comparative research effort addressed two major questions: Does law matter for economic
development? and Is Asia different?
To explore these questions, the research guidelines asked the scholars in each country to divide
the period from 1960 to 1995 into major economic policy periods and to analyze legal change
separately for each period. The purpose of this exercise was first, to identify the areas of the law
that experienced most change, and second, to explore the nature of legal change during different
policy periods.
The modern legal history of the countries included in the study suggested that major legal
changes, such as the adoption of civil and commercial codes, or the establishment of a court
system with broad jurisdiction, could not be expected for the period under investigation. These
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changes had taken place in most countries much earlier. An exception is China, where earlier
changes were repealed by the new socialist order so that the legal development after 1978 in
many areas of the law started virtually from scratch.
Typology of Legal Systemsof Legal Systems
The research guidelines developed a typology of legal systems and served as a common reference
for detecting changes in the nature of legal system. The typology of legal systems presented in
the comparative report maps a country’s legal system along two dimensions: a procedural
dimension which depicts whether a legal system is more or less rule-based as opposed to
discretionary; and an allocative dimension, which captures  whether the legal system refers the
decision over the allocation of economic resources primarily to the market or to the state. In
theory, the two dimensions may combine in four ways: market/rule-based; market/discretionary;
state/rule-based; and state/discretionary.
Legal and Economic Indicatorsand Economic Indicators
The following indicators were used to locate a country’s legal system along these two dimensions
at any point in time, including:
the contents of major legal rules;
the role of the executive as opposed to the legislature in issuing such rules;
the discretion exercised by rule makers and rule enforcers;
the status of courts and judges;
the status of the legal profession;
public opinion about the legal system.
In addition, economic indicators were used to measure the allocative role of the state vs. the
private sector, among others:
the size of the state owned sector;
the extent of trade controls, including quotas, tariffs, and black market premia as an indication
for foreign exchange controls;
state controls over the financial sector, such as state ownership of banks and controls over the
allocation of credits.
To the extent possible, relevant data were collected for the entire period from 1960 to 1995.
Where data has not been available, or a country’s historical development suggested a different
periodization, this was taken into account. The analysis of China’s economic development and
interaction between legal and economic development, for example, focuses primarily on the
reform period from 1978 to 1995.
iii
Macro- vs. Microanalysis- vs. Microanalysis
The primary focus of the analysis outlined above was the overall change of a country’s legal
system. We refer to this as the macroanalysis. In order to obtain a better understanding of the
actual functioning of specific laws and legal institutions, the research guidelines supplemented
this analysis with a microanalysis. Although we do not present the findings of the microanalysis
in this series of essays, many of the findings of the macroanalysis are informed by the
microanslysis.
Three areas of the law were selected for the microanalysis, each of which includes several
subareas:
Business Governance (corporate law, securities market regulation)
Credit and Security (secured transactions; property rights, contract law); and
Dispute Settlement Institutions (courts, arbitration bodies, civil and administrative procedure
codes).
Rather than attempting to link changes in these areas of law to overall economic performance as
measured by GDP growth rates, this research sought to find patterns of interaction between
specific laws and legal institutions on the one hand and intermediate growth factors on the other
hand. Intermediate growth factors (IGFs) are defined as factors, which reflect the structure of an
economy, including its key institutions. The major IGFs used in this study include:
Capital Formation;
Lending Volume;
Division of Labor.
Each IGF corresponds to one area of the law; i.e. capital formation to business governance;
lending volume  to credit and security; and division of labor to dispute settlement institutions.
Katharina Pistor and Philip A. Wellons
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1.  Korea's Legal System as of the Early 1960s
The year 1945 witnessed the coming to an end of the colonial period in Korea (1910-45).
After a short transition period, the First Republic was inaugurated under the leadership of the first
President, Syngman Rhee. The First Republic enacted a New Constitution in 1948 and adopted a
modern legal system modeled after its counterparts in developed countries. This period continued
until the year 1960, which was one of the most memorable years in Korean political history. The
First Republic collapsed as a result of the April 19 Student Revolution, which brought about the
amendment of the Korean Constitution in June 1960 for the promotion of the democratization of
Korean society. In light of this sudden demand for the immediate democratization of the country,
however, President Myon Chang's Second Republic proved to be unstable as it could not
accommodate the changes that this demand entailed. As a result, on May 16 1961, Military General
Chunghee Park led a coup d'etat to topple the government, and again in 1962, the Constitution was
amended and the entire structure of the legal system and legal institutions were changed.
Immediately after the inauguration of the Third Republic in 1963, President Park's government
actively passed many substantive economic laws. Accordingly, the legal system as of 1960 was
caught in a flux of political turbulence and as a result, most of the legal institutions were in a stage
of transition. Therefore, in the case of Korea, it is more appropriate to describe changes in the legal
system and substantive economic laws of the early 1960s, rather than to focus only on those as of
1960.
1. A. Substantive Economic Laws
During the era of the First Republic in the 1950s, the liberal government had already enacted
major civil, commercial and economic laws. Thus, although the issue of the respective effectiveness
of these laws may be debatable, the existence of a significant number of substantive economic laws
in 1960 is irrefutable.
1.A.1. Laws Governing Property Rights
Except for intellectual property rights, basic laws governing property rights can be found in
the Civil Code, which was enacted in 1958 and made effective as of January 1, 1960. Until that time,
the Japanese Civil Code had been applied. Provisions governing inheritance were also included in
the Civil Code. Although not free from the influence of Japanese jurisprudence, laws governing real
2property and personal/movable property were effectively enforced in 1960. This area of law was not
influenced by the turbulent political chaos of the time. In addition, major intellectual property laws
were also in place in 1960. The Patent Act and Trademark Act were enacted in 1947 and 1949,
respectively, and were followed by the Copyright Act in 1957. As in many other developing
countries, however, these laws were not effectively enforced during that period.
1.A.2. Laws Governing Private Economic Activity
The Civil Code, which was made effective as of January 1, 1960, contained provisions
regarding agency, contracts and basic rules for secured transactions. Until that time, no specific laws
dealing with these areas of laws had existed. Since these areas of the law inherited substantial aspects
from their Japanese counterparts, it is undeniable that the courts relied on Japanese jurisprudence
in dealing with these cases. In 1960, law regarding competition did not exist in Korea. The
Bankruptcy Law was first enacted on January 20, 1962, but until recently had never been effectively
made use of, and therefore there was no judicial decision on the issue of bankruptcy at that time.
Further, although the Law of Trusts was first introduced in December 1961, like the Bankruptcy
Law, this law was seldom used during this period. In addition, no environmental law was in
existence in 1960. It was not until 1963 that the Pollution Prevention Act was enacted. At this time,
environmental issues did not draw public attention and, consequently enforcement of the
environmental law at that time was neglected. Moreover, there were no strong voices calling for the
protection of the environment in the early 1960s.
1.A.3. Laws to Control the Government
The Administrative Petitions Act was passed in 1951 and was therefore in force in 1960.
This law enabled citizens who had been adversely affected by illegal administrative actions to
petition for relief from the administration. It established the Petitions Adjudication Committee,
endowing it with the authority to advise the government on matters of the administrative review of
State actions. Nevertheless, in practice, this Committee did not act as an independent agency for the
review of the legality of particular administrative actions. Thus, in reality the Administrative
Petitions Act did not effectively contribute to the provision of administrative relief for Korean
citizens. The Administrative Litigation Act was also in place as at 1960, and provided legal
procedures for interested citizens to challenge illegal administrative actions before the courts.
However, this Act was also subject to significant limitations in many respects. The Constitution
under the First Republic contained several provisions for the assurance of local autonomy, e.g. it
enabled the heads of municipalities to be directly elected by the citizens. However, these
Constitutional provisions were suspended as a result of the Martial Law imposed after the military
coup d'etat by Chunghee Park. In addition, several independent laws which aimed at promoting local
autonomy were also in effect. One of these laws was the Local Autonomy Act of 1949, which
governed the organization of local autonomous bodies and the elections of heads of those bodies.
As noted, this law was also suspended by the military coup d’etat of 1961.
In the financial sector, laws relating to exchange controls were not implemented until 1961,
with the enactment of the Foreign Exchange Control Law. This legislation was designed to replace
the law of the American Occupying Forces and aimed at managing foreign exchange and other
3overseas transactions, maintaining the balance of international revenue and expenditure, stabilizing
currency value and providing for the effective management of foreign currency funds.
1.A.4. Laws Governing Access to Markets
After the Korean War came to an end in 1953, Korea was left with a void in terms of capital
necessary for the achievement of economic recovery and development.1 Accordingly, legislation was
enacted in an effort to seek these badly needed financial resources from international sources, in
order to build and develop basic and strategic industrial sectors. These financial resources took the
form of equity investments, public and commercial loans, and technology licensing, and were kept
under the strict governmental management. Strict implementation of the laws with respect foreign
investment over the past three decades has been viewed as one of the factors contributing to the
economic success of Korea.2 In 1960, the Korean government enacted the Foreign Investment
Encouragement Act, which was later followed by the Foreign Capital Inducement Act (FCIA) of
1960. In its original form, the 1960 Foreign Capital Inducement Act was criticized for failing to
provide a satisfactory legal scheme for the promotion and regulation of foreign investment. This
factor, together with the unsatisfactory efforts of the government to solicit foreign investment, as
well as the political instability during and immediately after the military coup d'etat led by the late
President Park, have been identified by some scholars as the primary causes of the discouragement
of foreign direct investments at that time. The foreign capital which was attracted during this period
was mostly in the form of foreign commercial loans, often subject to unfavorable conditions. At this
stage, foreign capital was carefully considered within the context of the first five year economic
development plan issued in 1962, but more emphasis was placed on the quantity of the loans rather
than on the quality of their terms and conditions.3
1.A.5. Sectoral Laws
Laws with respect to negotiable instruments and trusts were not enacted until 1962 and 1961
respectively. In addition, legislation regarding small business was not passed until 1966. The
Banking Law, however, was in place in 1960, and was primarily aimed at contributing to national
economic development by making necessary provisions concerning the management and supervision
of private banks and other financial institutions. The 1950 Bank of Korea Act established the Bank
of Korea as the Central Bank in Korea. Later, the Securities and Exchange Law was adopted in 1962,
modeled after its counterpart in the U.S.
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2 Song (1996) supra, p. 743.
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41.A.6. Laws for the Organization of Firms
Prior to 1962, corporate law in Korea had been regulated by the Japanese Commercial Code.
It was only after this time that indigenous Korean legislation was passed with respect to corporate
behavior. The Company Law of Korea is provided for in Part 3 of the 1962 Korean Commercial
Code. The only kinds of corporations that are recognized under this law include general partnership
companies, limited partnerships, stock companies and limited companies, the establishment of which
are to follow the rules of law prescribed in the Code. Before 1963, company law in Korea was
adopted from the corporate law of the Japanese Commercial Code and the law regarding limited
companies that had been in place prior to liberation. The 1962 Company Law of Korea is peculiar
in that it retains the framework of the preceding law which had been founded on the basis of German
law, while at the same time introducing the concept of various Anglo-American legal institutions,
such as the system of a board of directors, and the system of authorized capital into the stock firm.4
1.A.7. Laws Governing Factors of Production
In order to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of the labor laws that were in existence in
1960, it first seems necessary to describe the early history of Korean labor laws prior to 1960. After
Korea's liberation from the ruling Japanese regime in 1945, the Korean government initially relied
on a few basic labor laws which were temporary in nature. Later, in 1948, Korea promulgated its
Constitution, which was influenced by Western democratic ideals and patterned after the
Constitution of the United States.5 Al hough the constitutional democratic system introduced at that
time would later undergo many changes, it would continue to be a strong foundation for Korea's
development. The 1948 Constitution contained several provisions regarding workers' rights and labor
relations. In particular, Chapter II guaranteed freedom of choice of occupation and the right to work.
The Government was empowered to determine labor standards, promote social security, and protect
those citizens incapable of making a living. The Constitution declared that "workers have the
autonomous right of organization, collective bargaining, and collective action in order to improve
working conditions[,]" collectively referred to as the three privileges of workers.
However, as workers suffered under the effects of the subsequent Korean War, labor disputes
were rife, and demands on the government for legislation to govern the disputes was intense. As a
result, in 1953, five years after the enactment of the Constitution, and in response to pressure from
the US (in the form of the United Nations Command), Korea passed four central acts largely
patterned on the American model of labor laws, thereby establishing a comprehensive legal
framework for the protection of workers' rights:6 the Labor Union Act, the Labor Dispute Adjustment
Act, Labor Relations Commission Act and the Labor Standards Act. These four pieces of legislation
were enacted to carry out the spirit of the Constitution. With respect to the work force, these laws
reflect to a major extent, post-World War II Japanese legislation together with the influence of the
US occupation during the 1945-48 period. Hence these laws, which remain the foundation of Korean
labor legislation today, reflect tinges of both the Continental and the Anglo-American systems.
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5These laws applied throughout the 1950s without subsequent amendments, creating a
situation where, in consequence, the rights of workers were not effectively protected by legislation.
For instance, the trade unions that existed in the 1950s were politically controlled by the Liberal
Party, the then ruling party.7 Thus, no systemized labor movement could take place effectively.
Moreover, labor practice has seldom resembled the legal structure set forth in these laws, which have
undergone numerous amendments since the decade of their enactment. Scholars agree that the laws
as they were initially enacted were too ambitious to be enforceable given the social and economic
reality of Korea at that time in history. The laws were not carefully tailored to Korea's unique labor
history, the extent of unemployment, or the general economic conditions then prevailing.8 Further,
these scholars argue that it was impractical to impose a system of democratic labor representation
which had been patterned after the philosophy of industrialized countries, on a "politically and
economically crippled nation."9
1.B. Legal Institutions and Process
As noted above, in June, 1960, an amendment was passed in relation to the Constitution
which, until that time, had adopted the presidential system. However, the 1960 amendment following
the collapse of the First Republic was directed at promoting the democratization of Korea. This
amendment introduced the parliamentary system and established the Constitutional Court into Korea.
It also enabled heads of municipal bodies to be elected by means of formal elections, and provided
that the judiciary was to be legally independent of the executive branch.
During the short era of the Second Republic, Korean citizens enjoyed a degree of freedom
which had been suppressed during the reign of the First Republic. The voice of the people was
stronger than any legal institution, and therefore the Second Republic was politically very unstable.
This is reflected in a subsequent amendment to the Constitution in November 1960, when the public
called on the government to enact special laws to punish high-ranking officials of the First Republic.
In light of such heavy pressure from the people, the government could not avoid amending the
Constitution to make possible ex post facto penalties, particularly against "anti-democratic c s"
undertaken during the period of the First Republic.10 This illustrates the nature of the Korean legal
institutions of 1960. For instance, the judiciary could do nothing to intervene in this matter, except
to apply such a very odd punitive law. The Constitutional Court established under the Second
Republic was not given a chance to exercise its power of review over the unconstitutionality of this
new punitive law since the Constitution was amended accordingly.
The modern court system had already been established before 1960. In 1960, the courts in
Korea handled all kinds of legal disputes, including civil, commercial, criminal and administrative
cases. All courts came within the framework of the Judiciary, which was constitutionally
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6independent of the executive branch and the legislature. The courts were structured in terms of three
levels: the Supreme Court, High Court (mostly courts of appeal), and District Courts. At that time,
no special courts, such as administrative courts, had been established. As far as non-politically
sensitive cases are concerned, the courts were regarded as fairly independent. Government
expenditure on the judiciary at that time was very limited. Statistical data demonstrates that in 1960
the judicial resources made up only 0.68 percent of the total annual government budget.
Arbitration as a means of alternative dispute settlement was used only after the enactment
of the Arbitration Act in 1966. In 1960, conciliation and mediation were not available as a
mechanism for resolving disputes. Prior to this time, private law disputes were settled only under
the jurisdiction of the courts acting pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure. Cases of a special
nature, such as labor, mass media, and public nuisance disputes, were handled by administrative
agencies. In sum, all types of legal disputes were handled by the judiciary and administrative
agencies, and informal institutions were not used
for resolving disputes in 1960.
This does not mean, however, that the Korean people were particularly litigious at that time.
Indeed, statistical data demonstrates that in 1960 only 25,112 civil cases were filed at the level of
the District Court throughout the entire country. In comparison, the number of criminal cases at the
same level was 71,712. This data reflects, and provides evidence of the reluctance of the Korean
people to resort to the court in order to resolve civil disputes. It may have been the influence of
Confucian values that guided the Korean people to resolve their disputes outside the courtroom.
1.C. The Legal Profession
Although exact statistics are not available, it is understood that in 1960, Korea had a mere
handful of colleges of law or legal departments attached to universities, and of the students studying
in these legal departments therein, on average, very few students graduated each year. In addition,
as legal education was conducted at the undergraduate level, graduation from the legal department
at college did not guarantee the license to practice as a lawyer. Rather, it was necessary for applicants
to pass the National Judicial Examination, which was administered by the government, and was
notoriously difficult to pass at that time. It was not required that applicants of the examination be
graduates of law schools; even those without a college education were allowed to apply for the
examination. However, the difficulty of passing the exam may be demonstrated by the fact that in
1960, only 31 out of 5 557 applicants passed the National Judicial examination. This amounts to a
passing rate of 0.5 percent.
Most law teachers in 1960 had been educated in Japanese law schools prior to the 1945
liberation of Korea from Japanese rule. It was therefore natural that Korean legal education in 1960
was subject to the strong influence of the Japanese legal system, which was in turn based on the
continental legal system, particularly that of Germany. Since it was enormously difficult to pass the
judicial exam, many law students did not take the judicial exam and instead pursued non-l gal
careers, such as government officials, bankers or businessmen. Indeed, while most of the successful
candidates were graduates of "better" universities, other universities failed to produce a single
7graduate who passed the examination.11 Despite the "sudden demand" for Korean attorneys
following the departure of the Japanese,12 by 1960 there were still only 456 practicing attorneys in
Korea. Thus, the Korean Bar Association was not powerful and its organization was still loose.
Further, as most of the practicing lawyers were retired judges or prosecutors, not only was their own
self-estimation very high, they were also in practice highly regarded within Korea.
In order to become a lawyer, a successful candidate of the judicial exam was required to
receive training under the administration of the Judiciary. Nonetheless, this training program was
not very well organized. The qualifications necessary to become judges or prosecutors were the same
as those needed to become practicing attorneys. Judges and prosecutors were not selected from
experienced attorneys, but were rather appointed to such positions upon their successful undertaking
of the judicial exam and completion of the training program. The implication of this was, of course,
that judges under the age of thirty were not uncommon.
In 1960, there were a mere 291 judges, which increased in number to 372 over the next five
years, distributed between the Supreme Court, the three High Courts, and the ten13 Di trict Courts.14
Almost 30 000 civil cases were heard by these judges in the year 1960, in the following manner of
distribution:15
i) Courts of First Instance:  25 112
ii) Appellate Courts:  3 817
iii) Supreme Court:  934
It should be noted, however, that although these are only the statistics for civil cases, the
courts had general jurisdiction to preside over civil, criminal, administrative and other litigious cases,
as well as the authority to decided non-contentious cases and other matters that f ll within their
jurisdiction in accordance with specific legislation.
Korean "law" in the 1960s was seen primarily as an agent of rapid political regimentation.
Thus, despite the fundamental democratic principle of the separation of powers enshrined in the text
of the Constitution (1962 amendment), in practice, there was much criticism of the lack of
employment by judges of their full autonomous power as guaranteed by the Constitution, i.e. their
failure to maintain their independence particularly in the determination of politically sensitive
cases.16 Through the powers of dismissal and assignment, the higher authorities were able to sanction
judges merely because of specific decisions they made against the interests of the ruling powers,17
thereby intervening politically in the judicial process. A prime example of this is the dismissal in
1961 of 56 judges (18 percent) following the military coup d'etat. However, it must be kept in mind
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8that this sort of executive interference effectively only occurred in respect of cases in which the
government had an interest; when the executive assumed an increasingly authoritarian posture, court
decisions on political cases were strongly colored to defend the legitimacy of the government.18
Nevertheless, as far as ordinary civil cases were concerned, judges still appeared to maintain a fair
level of independence.
Thus, it appears that during the early 1960s, the lack in number of legal professionals,
together with the strong political influence wielded over the judicial system, prevented the
recognition of individual rights, and instead resulted in the intervention by the executive in judicial
proceedings, particularly in respect of politically sensitive cases. Nevertheless, in dealing with
ordinary non-political cases, courts, on the whole, seem to have been just and fair.19
1.D. Type of Legal System and Sources of Law
The modern Korea legal system was established on the basis of the German and Japanese
models by virtue of the initial imposition of Japanese colonial power at the turn of the century. Even
after liberation from Japanese rule, this Civil Law system continued to apply, and by the early 1960s,
the six major fundamental codes of Korea were all in existence: the Constitution (1948), the Civil
Code (1958), the Commercial Code (1960), the Code of Civil Procedure, the Criminal Code (1953),
and the Code of Criminal Procedure (1954). Other forms of written law included the statutes of the
National Assembly, Presidential Decrees, Ministerial Ordinances and regulations issued by
government ministries, certain rules made by the National Assembly and the Supreme Court, and
treaties. Like other East-Asian countries, however, the Korean legal system in 1960 was not free
from Confucian influence. This could be seen in the laws governing domestic relations and
inheritance, which reflected Confucian values in many respects.
While it was generally assumed that the code was the exclusive basis for judicial decisions,
the Civil Code provided that in the absence of written laws concerning civil matters, a judge was to
decide the issue in accordance with customary law; in the absence of customary law, the matter was
to be decided taking into account Jori.20 In principle, even today, custom that is not contrary to public
order or morality has the normative value of law, provided that it is not excluded by statute.
Accordingly, custom is usually a subsidiary source of law that a judge may apply only in the absence
of a specific statute. In this situation, to the extent that custom assists the judge in arriving at a
reasoned judgment, custom is a persuasive ground for a decision.21
Another source of law peculiar to Korea is the concept of J ri (Racta Ratio), which
corresponds in broad terms to what the French know as the general principles of law. In all but
criminal cases, the judge may resort to Jori in he absence of any other source of law, legislative or
customary, in reaching a conclusion. In practice, however, it is very rare that a judge relies on Jori
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9alone, as most of the issues faced by judges today are the subject of legislation or precedent.22 Thus,
it is clear that Korean law admits a hierarchy of sources of law.
1.E. Popular Attitudes towards the Legal System
No formal surveys concerning popular attitudes towards the legal system seem to have been
conducted in 1960. Nevertheless, frequent amendments to the Constitution and subsequent changes
in laws may be seen as reflecting popular attitudes towards the legal system and legal institutions.
An extreme example of this may be the amendment of the Constitution two times in 1960; the latter
of these two amendments was to make ex post facto penalties possible against former government
officials. This indicates that the people as well as the government in the early 1960s viewed the law
as the one tool that was always changeable. The principle of the rule of law did not exist in Korea
in 1960, and accordingly, Korean citizens did not seem to regard the law very highly. Furthermore,
the results of a study conducted in 1964 may give an indication of the general attitude towards the
law as it existed in the early 1960s. A random sample of 1 301 persons in Korea were selected and
examined in respect of their attitude towards the law by Professor Hahm Pyong-Choon. In general,
Hahm's evidence demonstrated that there was considerable reluctance on the part of citizens to resort
to law in order to solve pressing problems under any circumstances. For example, only 32.22% said
that they would go to court to settle a family problem which could not otherwise be resolved by
family, clan or other form of conciliation.
In accordance with the Confucian ethical background in Korea of the co-mingling of law and
morality, law also appeared to be tempered by social and ethical factors: the relative social or
economic status of the people involved, and the Confucian norms of behavior. In choosing a better
person between a filial law-breaker and an unfilial law-abider, 41.76% picked the filial law-bre ker
as the better person, while 33.22% picked the law-abiding person. Further, in questions of adultery,
51.38% felt the woman was more to blame, while only 8.3% felt the man was more to blame; this
seems to be reflection of Confucian values. In addition, if a destitute family illegally built a shack
on another's land, 80.25% would have let them stay, and only 7.15% would have forced them to
leave. If the land was needed, and the family refused to move, only 14.76% would have resorted to
the law, while 40.68% would have given the family money to move. In light of these results, Hahm
concludes that social justice was deemed more important than law.23
There also appeared to be considerable reluctance to consult the police and to blame or take
action against the government. Only 56.91% said that they would inform the police if they saw
someone steal, and that figure dropped to 30.91% if it was a poor man on the verge of starvation
stealing from a rich man. Further, in a case where, in the American context, the state would have
been clearly to blame for an unrepaired bridge, constructed with public funds, which caused injury
to a citizen, 73.75 % of the Koreans surveyed said that it was the fault of the person who got hurt.
Hahm concluded that the rural sector was the most alegal and accepting element in the population
as one might have expected, that the metropolitan population (Seoul) was more legally oriented, and
                                                       
22 Ibid.
23 Hahm Pyong-Choon, cited in Choi Chongko, "Traditional Korean Law and Its Modernization," originally
published in Transactions of Royal Asiatic Society (1989), vol. 64, included in personal compilation of author's
essays: Law in Korea, (1995) p. 12.
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that the urban provincial sector was more prone to compromise. In general, the group in Korean
society most prone to be aggressive about rights and resort to the law was the lower middle classes
who were high school graduates. The upper classes, college graduates and the wealthy were more
inclined to avoid the law and felt more vulnerable, perhaps because of tax evasion.24
The conclusions reached indicate that Koreans in the 1960s clearly preferred moral values
to legal merits in life, and were inclined more towards a political way of thinking than a judicial one;
they valued harmony over argumentation, and were skeptical about the decisions of the courts. In
fact, Professor Hahm called Korea a "dispute-avoiding" culture.25 The popular attitude towards legal
institutions does not seem to have been much different. The Student Revolution of 1960 brought
down the First Republic. Only one year after the Revolution, a military coup suspended the
Constitution and almost re-drafted it. In light of such conduct, it may be concluded that Korean
people in general did not at that time appreciate the principle of the rule of law. Having said this,
however, it would nevertheless appear that a major reservation to this statement lies in respect of
civil cases, particularly those concerning property rights; once initiated and determined, civil law
cases and judgments seemed to be effectively implemented and respected. Indeed, Professor Pak
Byong-Ho indicated the active legal capacity of possession of land as a positive indication of the rule
of law.26 Thus, despite the instability of the political situation, ordinary civil cases appear to have
been appropriately handled. Moreover, in spite of the above arguments indicating a tendency on the
part of Koreans to give priority to morality over legal considerations, it is nevertheless evident that
judges and other legal practitioners occupied a position of high standing and respect within society
at that time.
1.F. Assessment of the Legal System as at 1960
The above review of the Korean laws and legal system as they stood in the early 1960s leads
one to the conclusion that although a set of fundamental formal laws were in place at that time, the
lack of enforcement institutions and coherent government policies with respect to the use of these
rules means that it is difficult to classify the nature of the laws. The military government of the early
1960s introduced legislation that seemed to be rather discretionary in nature as its purpose generally
appeared to be the implementation of state policy in accordance with the prevailing political doctrine
of the governing party. Regulation of the financial and commercial sectors was quite strict, and the
government often seemed to act quite arbitrarily in implementing changes. Furthermore, although
recourse against wrongful state actions was provided for in principle by administrative regulations,
in practice the lack of independence on the part of arbitrary bodies prevented effective relief for
individuals.
At the same time, however, there were calls for democratization from within the society at
large, and thus the new Constitutional amendments introduced the parliamentary system and
provided for, inter alia, the independence of the judiciary. Although this purported democratization
of the Constitution may imply a movement towards more rights-based laws, in practice, and in other
spheres of legal activity, this was obviously not the case. Labor rights, intellectual property rights,
                                                       
24 Op.cit. p.13.
25 Ibid.
26 Pak Byong-Ho, "Traditional Korean Society and Law," Seoul Law Journal, 1972.
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and rights of recourse against wrongful state acts, are only several of the rights allegedly guaranteed
by legislation, but in reality not effectively protected. Moreover, in light of a somewhat traditional
hesitance to resort to the courts for the resolution of disputes, together with a limited number of legal
professionals, access to the legal system was in practice not effectively promoted or utilized. In spite
of this, however, one area in which a positive attitude towards the law may be evidenced was the
area of civil cases, and in particular, property rights.
Thus, it appears that despite the purported efforts of the government to democratize the
Korean society of the early 1960s, many rights that were guaranteed in principle were not given
effect in practice, and in general the government instead used law as a tool to implement its own
political agenda. A major reservation to this statement, however, lies in respect of the area of private
civil cases, particularly property cases, into which government influence and/or interference did not
extend.
2. Major Changes in the Korean Legal System 1960-19
2.A. Major Changes in Substantive Economic Laws
During the past several decades, many substantive economic laws have developed along with
dynamic changes in the Korean economy. Certain economic laws were closely related to economic
development; other laws have remained intact or changed independently of economic development.
Considering the purpose of this project, it would seem appropriate to analyze the major changes in
substantive economic laws which were closely related with economic development over the last
several decades. In some cases, the enactment of these economic laws has resulted in the acceleration
of the speed of economic development. In other cases, changes in the economic conditions of Korea
has resulted in a series of legislative activities. The following seven economic laws which fall under
this category have been selected in order to analyze the relationship between their changes over the
last several decades vis-a- i  the economic development of Korea. 
These seven laws are:
(i) intellectual property law (laws governing property rights)
(ii) competition law (laws governing private economic activity)
(iii) administrative law (laws to control the government)
(iv) law relating to foreign investment (laws governing access to markets)
(v) laws relating to industrial development (sectoral laws)
(vi) corporate law (laws concerning the organization of firms).
(vii) labor law (laws governing the factors of production)
In general, changes in the major economic laws have been closely related to changes in the
economy of Korea, and vice-versa. Nevertheless, the Korean team has found that the answer to the
question of which is the leading factor: the law and/or the economy, depends on the time period and
the subject area of the laws and relevant economic policies. During some periods, economic growth
benefited from far-reaching legal changes, while in other periods, the law can be seen as choking
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long-term growth. The conclusions also depend on which areas of law and economic policy are being
analyzed.
2.A.1. Laws governing Property Rights: Intellectual Property Law
The law regarding Intellectual Property in 1960 consisted of the following pieces of
legislation, which had been enacted in 1946 and 1949 respectively: the Patent Act and the Trademark
Act. Both pieces of legislation applied at the national level. In the 1960s, a generally negative
attitude toward intellectual property rights (IPR) was prevalent and affected a large part of Korean
society outside the top economic circles. Even law enforcement institutions, including the police,
prosecutors, and sometimes even courts, were not free from such a negative attitude.27 Under these
circumstances, the intellectual property laws of Korea were not effectively enforced until quite
recently. It has been suggested that the underlying motive behind the enactment of the Intellectual
Property laws was not the uninhibited will of the Korean government, but rather that the laws were
enacted to meet the demands of foreigners. Indeed, one cannot fail to note that the American
Chamber of Commerce in Seoul was very active in lobbying for strong protection of Intellectual
Property Rights in Korea.
The past decade has seen much progress in the area of Intellectual Property Rights. In
addition to US pressure, this is due in part to the changing global economic environment which has
urged Korea to provide real protection for IPR in order to maintain its competitiveness in inducing
high-technology to its shores. Another source of pressure for the protection of IPR comes from
within Korean domestic industry itself. During the 1980s, Korea gradually increased investment in
research and development (R&D), so that the total R&D expenditure, private and public, jumped
from being a mere 0.46 per cent of Korea's GNP in 1970, to 2.24 per cent in 1990, an increase of five
times the original percentage. As a result, this sharp increase in R&D investment by Korean
companies created pressure for the effective protection of the outcome of R&D, i.e. patents,
trademarks, and copyrights. In 1986, Korea, in accordance with an agreement with the US, agreed
to heighten the degree of IPR protection by amending the laws relating to patents and copyrights.28
During the early stages of this amendment, Korean citizens as well as law enforcers did not seem
very sympathetic towards the new law, which had, in effect, been made in response to US pressure.
However, as time went by, the level of actual enforcement substantially increased.
As noted above, this is due to the fact that Korea needed to induce high-technologies from
abroad in order to promote domestic economic development, and Korean domestic industry itself
needed protection for its own intellectual property rights. As the Uruguay Round negotiations on
intellectual property rights issues continued, the Korean government voluntarily amended its IP laws
to conform with the possible form of future multilateral agreements on intellectual property rights.
For instance, the Korean government amended in advance several IP laws in conformity with the
so-called Dunkel Draft of the Multilateral Trade Agreement. After the final Act of the Uruguay
Round Trade Negotiation was concluded, Korea amended its IP laws in order to fully conform with
the obligations of the WTO Agreement.
                                                       
27 Song Sang-Hyun, Korean Law in the Global Economy, (1996) p.1035.
28 Song (1996) supra, p.1036.
13
 1) Historical Development of Key Intellectual Property Laws
 (i) Patents
Since its enactment in 1946, the Korean Patent Act has been amended several times. However,
despite the apparent improvement in protection that such amendments would infer, the protection
of inventions such as those concerning chemical substances per se was not allowed until 1987. Until
then, only process patents were available for chemical inventions. The ban on patent protection of
chemical substances provided a detour for local manufacturers of pharmaceutical and agroch micals.
In addition, the term of patent protection was a mere 12 years from publication, compared with the
17 years from the grant in the US, and 20 years from application in many European countries.
However, this situation was vastly improved when, as a result of Korea-US negotiations in 1986, the
Patent Act was amended (effective of 1 July, 1987) to allow for patent protection of chemical
substances, pharmaceuticals, and grochemicals. In addition, the patent term was also extended from
12 to 15 years
 (ii) Copyright
The Korean Copyright Act, which was originally enacted in 1957, and subsequently amended
in 1986 and 1993, is essentially a general law for the protection of all kinds of copyrighted works.
However, the old Copyright Act failed to contain provisions for the protection of products
such as computer programs, and it was not even clear whether computer program works could be
classified as protectable subject matter. Nevertheless, it was in response to this that in 1986, as a
result of Korea-US negotiations, the new Copyright Act specifically defined computer programs as
a kind of protectable work. Also in relation to copyrights, the Phonogram Act and the Motion Picture
Act, which had initially been enacted mainly for regulatory purposes, were also sometimes invoked
in order to penalize the violation of copyrights. Thus, although not originally designed for that
purpose, these Acts have had some indirect effect on the protection of IPR. A further defect in the
original 1957 Copyright Act was the absence of a provision dealing with the protection of foreigners'
works. This omission was not addressed for some time, as Korea was not a member of the Bern
Convention nor the Universal Copyright Convention. Nevertheless, Korea-US negotiations in 1986
resulted in the enactment of a new Copyright Act which provides protection to all works enumerated
in Article 1 of the Universal Copyright Convention, thus covering virtually the entire scope of
intellectual and cultural activities. Further, the enactment of the Computer Program Protection Act
prescribed detailed provisions for the protection of computer programs, and in the new Copyright
Act of 1986, protection of derivative works and compilations was ensured. Finally, the 1986 Act
provided protection for neighboring rights for stage performers, phonogram producers, and
broadcasters. Hence, it has been suggested that the 1986 amendment of the Copyright Act practically
amounted to the enactment of a new law.29
                                                       
29 Song (1996) supra, p.1038.
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 2) The Impact of Multilateral Trade Negotiations30
 (i) Patents
By virtue of TRIPS, Article 4, the principle of MFN treatment is adopted as the basic tenet
of the TRIPs agreement, in contrast to the situation under the WIPO (World Intellectual Property
Organization) system, wherein national treatment, not the MFN, was the basic principle underlying
the relationship among member states. Under the MFN principle, the "pipeline protection" of
pharmaceuticals and grochemicals, which was given to US patent holders by the Korean
government in 1986, was expected to be accorded to the nationals of all other members of GATT
"immediately and unconditionally." This would mean that Korea was obligated to give the pipeline
protection to many EC countries as well as Japan, which incidentally was not obligatory under the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property, the cornerstone for international patent
protection under the WIPO system.
Accordingly, at the end of 1991, Korea granted the same kinds of pipeline protection to the
EC member states as was made with the US but for a shorter period of time (i.e. 5 years rather than
10). The mechanism for implementing the bilateral agreements was by means of "administrative
guidance" -- although this was not considered to be an effective or appropriate precedent as the
expression itself is not clearly defined, and the agreement is vulnerable to attack regarding its
enforceability.
 (ii) Copyright
Despite the considerable extent of amendments to Korean Intellectual Property legislation
in 1986, the standards of protection envisaged in the draft TRIPs could not be fully met31. As a
result, the Copyright Act was amended again following the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1993,
to be effective as of July 1994. These amendments included an explicit description of the protection
of databases, an extension of the term of protection for neighboring rights from 20 to 50 years, and
the recognition of rental rights in respect of phonograms. In addition, the 1993 amendments reduced
the scope of the exemption from compensation payments for educational use in high schools or
schools of lower level. Thus, it is possible to identify within these amendments, the recognition of
rental rights and the extension of term of protection for neighboring rights, a reflection of the TRIPs
provisions.
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 (iii) Stimulus for Legal and Economic Changes
The interaction of three major factors may be identified as stimulating economic and legal
development in the years following the early 1960s. Firstly, foreign pressure from technology
suppliers within the international community, who were concerned about the extent to which their
products were being copied by Korean competitors, created an international demand for the
amendment of Korean intellectual property laws. A leading illustration of this was the Korea-US
agreement for intellectual property protection in 1986, which summarized what foreigners demanded
from Korea in terms of such protection. In response to such agreements, substantive progress in
legislation regarding intellectual property was made, including patent protection on pharmaceuticals,
agrochemicals, and micro-organisms, and copyright protection of foreign works and computer
programs.
In addition, later multilateral trade negotiations had further effects on intellectual property
law reform in Korea. Negotiations for the TRIPs had a large impact on legislative activity within
Korea from the time it was announced that the TRIPs was included in the agenda for the UR in 1986.
As a result, new rights have been recognized in the Korean legal system for layout-designs of
integrated circuits, and trade secrets. The enactment of these laws was possible because the
negotiators for the TRIPs recognized those rights and provided international standards for protection.
The amendments to the law regarding intellectual property rights resulted in the positive
response of the Korean domestic economy, as the revised laws allowed certain industries to take
advantage of the increase in the protection of intellectual property rights, particularly in the areas of
pharmaceuticals, publishing and software. The increase in patent protection caused Korea's
pharmaceutical industry to focus research activities on finding new candidate compounds, which
required greater investment and more time than developing a detour process, which was usual under
the old process patent system. This provided a catalyst for the reorganization of the pharmaceutical
industry, which in turn brought about the involvement of general chemical manufacturers in the
pharmaceutical and agrochemical businesses. Further, the MFN treatment problem for pipeline
protection placed great stress on Korea, and thus required further the reform of patent laws. In
addition, as a result of increased protection of copyrights, publishing and software industries were
encouraged to develop, and the registration of computer programs increased sharply since the
enactment of the relevant new laws. Thus, it can be seen that foreign pressure brought about the
amendment of domestic Korean law regarding intellectual property, which in turn created the
opportunity for a positive economic response. In this situation therefore, law was the leading factor.
The second major factor that may be identified as a stimulus to economic and legal
development was the domestic demand from within the economy for high-tech foreign investment
inducement. The increase in labor costs which had followed the transfer of power from the military
to civilians, and the subsequent political democratization of the country had brought about great
changes in the Korean economy. It was in response to these changes in the business environment that
leaders of the Korean economy decided to strengthen the protection of IPR in order to induce foreign
technology and investment in Korea. In this situation, therefore, the economy may be identified as
the leading factor in causing subsequent changes in the law. The impact of the new laws relating to
foreign investment on the economy, however, remains to be seen.
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Thirdly, the demand from within Korean domestic industries for the adequate protection of
their own intellectual property rights may be seen as the final catalyst for the amendment and
development of the relevant laws.
Viewed in toto, therefore, it is clearly evident that it has been the continued interaction and
reaction between changes in the law and the economy that has brought about further developments
in both fields. In some instances, the law may be identified as the leading factor bringing about a
positive economic response, while in other respects, it was the economic situation which led to legal
amendments. It is difficult in many cases to determine which factor was the original stimulus, as
domestic economic demands may be traced back to changes in the legal environment, and vice versa.
Thus, it may be suffice simply to acknowledge the continued interaction between the law and the
economy in both directions.
2.A.2. Laws governing Private Economic Activity: Competition Law
 In 1960, no competition law was in existence in Korea which was designed to promote free
competition in marketplace. The first legislative proposal for competition law was made by the
government in 1963, although persistent resistance from the business community eventually
prevented it from reaching the floor of the legislature. Also at that time, economic growth was given
priority above all national economic policies, and the enactment of a competition law regulating
business entities was perceived as a potential hindrance to national economic growth.
In 1966 and 1967, the government again submitted to the legislature a proposal for the
enactment of a law regarding competition. However, these attempts were met with the criticism that
the Korean economy could not afford that kind of law at that stage of its development. In subsequent
years also, repetitive legislative efforts were blocked again. In the early 1970s, inflation was at the
center of national economic concerns. Many economists drew a connection between this inflation
and the monopolistic pricing behaviors of market dominant firms. However, the first oil shock in
1972 provided the turning point for Korean economic policy. The government placed price
stabilization at the top of its national economic agenda, recognizing Korea's need for a law which
regulated monopolistic pricing and thus contributed to a significant degree to the limiting of price
inflation in the Korean economy. It was against this background that the first Korean competition
law was enacted. This law was entitled the "Price Stabilization and Fair Trade Act" of 1975, and
pursued two main goals: price stabilization and the promotion of free competition in the
marketplace. Nevertheless, law enforcement bodies tended to place much heavier emphasis on the
goal of price stabilization, while competition law-related provisions were perceived merely as one
of several tools for price stabilization.32
The government-led Korean economy of the 1970s faced many difficulties as the end of the
decade approached. Inflation persistently eroded the root of the Korean economy, and the
concentration of economic power within the hands of market-d minant firms resulted in the
distortion of market functions. This also caused concern in terms of d stributional justice. In
December 1980, the "Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act" was passed in an effort to address
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the above concerns. This law was the first competition law in Korean history which had the primary
goal of promoting free and fair competition in the marketplace. In the early days of the Act, however,
the Korean government did not place high priority on competition policy among its overall economic
strategy. Moreover, in enforcing substantive provisions of the Act, the Korean Fair Trade
Commission (KFTC) always was under the influence of the Economic Planning Board, the Ministry
in charge of coordinating overall economic policies.33
By the mid-1980s, the Korean government had realized that the side-effects of economic
development -- a non-competitive domestic market structure and the concentration of economic
power -- had started to function as fundamental barriers to the further development of th  Korean
economy in its attempt to reach the level of developed countries. The Korean government also
realized that substantial sectors of the Korean economy should be deregulated and, at the same time,
that competition policy should be given high priority among the overall economic plan. On the basis
of this understanding, the Korean government has amended the Act several times since 1986 in order
to strengthen its provisions.34 The Act is patterned to a large extent on the antitrust statutes of
advanced market economies, especially those of the United States, Germany, and Japan. On the other
hand, the Act reflects certain Korea-specific economic traditions that were still prevalent at the time
the statute was drafted. For example, the majority of Korea's domestic product markets were already
monopolistic or ligopolistic by the late 1970s. Consequently, the Act focuses restrictions on the
unreasonable or anticompetitive pricing behaviors of market-dominant firms instead of directly
prohibiting monopolization or attempts at monopolization.35
In addition, the Act reflects one of Korea's most serious economic concerns - the
concentration of economic power in the hands of a few large business conglomerates. Accordingly,
the Act identifies the prevention of "excessive concentration of economic power" as one of its
objectives. The Act's policy goals are set forth in Article 1, and include "encouraging fair and free
competition, thereby stimulating creative business activities and protecting consumers as well as
promoting the balanced development of the national economy." In 1986, this Act was amended in
order to strengthen the provisions seeking to reduce the concentration of economic power. The Act
was toughened again in 1990, 1992, and 1994. In 1996, the KFTC proposed substantial amendments
to the Act. However, this legislative proposal again faced persistent resistance from the business
community, especially from interest groups representing large business conglomerates.
The current Act forbids the abuse of a market-dominant position, restricts business
combinations that would substantially harm competition, prohibits holding companies and
intercompany cross- wnership among large firms, limits equity investments by large firms, and
prohibits anti-competitive collusion, unfair business practices, and resale price maintenance. Upon
violation of the substantive provisions of the Act, the KFTC has the authority to issue administrative
cease-and-desist orders, or to take other corrective measures. The Commission possesse  almost
exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the enforcement of the Act; the Korean Department of Justice
has no section that is specially charged with enforcing the Antitrust laws. Although the
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Attorney-General may prosecute violations of the Act, such prosecution is usually contingent on the
KFTC's first requesting the Attorney General to do so. Further, although the courts may judicially
review administrative decisions of the KFTC, several provisions of the Act implicitly preclude the
courts from reviewing the substantive aspects of the Commission's decisions.
How effectively the competition law in Korea has been enforced has varied depending on the
time period as well as the nature of substantive provisions of the law. In the early stages of the Act,
the KFTC was still under the influence of the Prime Ministry, the EPB. As a result, the KFTC did
not act independently in respect of matters concerning competition law, and as a result, the law was
not rigorously enforced during the first half of the 1980s. As with the 1986 amendment to the Act,
the KFTC tried to regulate large business conglomerates by enforcing the new provisions of the Act
against them. In spite of governmental claims that the level of economic concentration in the Korean
economy has lessened since that time, economic data has proved to the contrary. Following the 1990
amendment, however, the KFTC became legally independent of any other ministries, although as
a matter of fact, the KFTC is not yet as powerful as other ministries in charge of economic policies.
Nevertheless, it is true that the KFTC has made considerable efforts to heighten the independent
status of the KFTC and enforce competition law subject to other external restraints such as conflicts
with other economic policy goals. Moreover, as the government realizes the importance of policies
of deregulation, there is a growing appreciation of the potential role the KFTC could play within
Korea.
Statistical data regarding the enforcement of the Competition Law over the last decade
indicates that not all of the substantive provisions of the Law have been applied in the same way.36
The provisions of the Act dealing with vertical restraints including resale price maintenance and
unfair trade practices were often invoked. However, the KFTC seldom enforced the Act in relation
to attacks on the non-competitive structure itself. For instance, the Act was not capable of regulating
mergers or monopolization. Due to the governmental-direct regulation of pricing behaviors, the Act
did not frequently apply to horizontal restraints. Nevertheless, the KFTC has recently tried to correct
this imbalance in the enforcement of the Act, although visible effects have yet to be observed.
2.A.3. Laws to Control the Government: Administrative Law
In principle, the Constitution and other statutes in general have allowed, since their
enactment, a person who has allegedly had his rights infringed upon by an act of the administration
to seek a remedy for the matter. Specifically, Article 26 of the Constitution provides that individuals
have the right to petition the government, and that the government branch to which the petition is
directed is under the obligation to review it. In conjunction with this right to challenge is the right
to demand compensation from the government under Article 29 for any injury suffered as a result
of an unlawful act by a civil servant. The claim itself may be brought directly against the authority
which made the decision or its superior, and a special administrative tribunal is provided for in every
ministry or agency which sits at first instance. In the past, however, although a plaintiff could bring
his case to a tribunal within the administrative authority, the system was unsatisfactory in that the
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matters that were referable to this body were strictly limited by law, and in practice administrative
authorities were able to abuse citizens' rights with impunity.37
It was in an effort to increase the protection of the rights of citizens that the Administrative
Litigation Law was enacted in 1951, establishing litigation procedures concerning the nullification
or revision of wrongful governmental measures and other rights related to public law. However, by
1984 changing administrative circumstances and the need for a further increase in the protection of
the rights of the people led to revisions of the law. Accordingly, these amendments created a
litigation system which allowed the confirmation of the wrongfulness of inaction by the government
in circumstances where there was a legal requirement on the part of the government to take certain
measures. Further, the revisions explicitly enunciated the concepts of communal litigation and
litigation concerning disputes between government organs. It also codified the power of the
arbitration body to make orders requiring compensation by the government, where the government
failed to comply with decisions of the organ. These revisions were supplemented by the enactment
in 1984 of the Administrative Adjudication Act under Article 108(3) of the Constitution, which
ensured that judicial procedure was to be observed within the procedures of administrative
judgments. The Act aimed at increasing protection of the rights of the citizens, and allowed the
individual to request the government to take certain measures that it had as yet failed to take, despite
its obligation, legal or otherwise, to do so.
In terms of practical effect, statistics regarding the number of administrative cases settled by
the courts reveal an increase from 322 of 340 cases filed in courts of first instance in 1961, to 1 726
of 1 882 cases filed in 1984.38 Throughout the 1960s until the late 1970s, the number of cases
concerning administrative matters remained low, generally well under 1000, while the late 1980s
witnessed a sharp increase to over 2 000 cases. Thus, it appears that the legislative amendments
made in respect of administrative actions had, in practical terms, a positive impact on the ability and
inclination of citizens to challenge actions of the state.
In 1994, further revisions were undertaken of the Administrative Litigation Law in an effort
to supplement the deficiencies of the 1984 system, under which the applicants had first to exhaust
administrative adjudicative procedures before they could bring proceedings in the High Court or
Supreme Court. These 1994 revisions, however, allowed citizens to bring actions directly to a
judicial court of first instance, the Administrative Court, which is to be established in 1998. In 1995,
the Administrative Adjudication Act was also amended in an effort to consolidate the administrative
adjudication system as an effective means of preserving and protecting the rights of the people, and
to maximize the democratic and equitable functions of administrative trials. In accordance with these
revisions, the Administrative Adjudication Committee, which had originally been set up under the
central executive body, is to be replaced by one established under the Prime Minister; the intention
being that with half of the committee consisting of citizens, the objectivity of the organ will be
maximized. Furthermore, prior to the 1995 revision, requests for administrative adjudication had to
be submitted via the dispositive office. The amendments replaced this procedure with a system
whereby an applicant can directly submit his/her case to the arbitration organ. In addition, the
                                                       
37 Song Sang-Hyun, "Civil Service and Administrative Actions," (1996) in Song, supra, p.1251.
38 Statistics provided by the Department of Judicial Administration, Annual Review of the Judiciary
(1961-1991).
20
examination procedure of the administrative adjudication tribunal has been democratized to a certain
extent by now allowing oral examinations, rather than hearings that considered purely written
documents. Moreover, in order to maximize the effectiveness of decisions of the administrative
adjudication organ, the organ may issue certain directives to enforce the decision if a government
branch or department does not give it proper effect.
In practical terms, the opportunities provided by these revisions for recourse against the state
was reflected in the dramatic increase in the number of cases filed and settled by the courts in the
years 1994 and 1995: by 1995, over 9 000 cases regarding administrative matters were settled by
courts of first instance. Accordingly, this general trend may imply not only an increase in practical
opportunities for recourse against the state, but an increase in the willingness of individuals to take
advantage of such provisions. The final important piece of administrative legislation is the
Administrative Procedure Act, also passed in 1995 (to come into effect in 1998) for the purpose of
attaining equity, transparency, and reliability in the administration and protection of people's rights.
The Act purported to achieve this through the establishment of measures which would ensure
governmental observance of rational standards and fair procedures when formulating policy and
legislation. Furthermore, the Act was designed to guarantee the opportunity whereby the opinions
of the people would be reflected.
Under the Act, the administrative department was to promulgate and give prior public notice
of the period of time of administrative measures to be taken and the criteria to be considered.
Moreover, in respect of measures deemed to restrict rights/interests or impose obligations on related
parties, the government was to give prior notice of such measures and to provide for hearings in
which public opinion regarding these issues could be gathered. The government was also to offer
explanations of the basis or reason for the implementation of such measures. Hearings were to be
set up when the law required it and the government deemed it necessary, and the procedures for such
hearings were to be enacted. The Act also provided that the government was to give prior public
notice when legislating, revising or abrogating laws, politics, institutions or plans related to the
everyday lives of the people. Furthermore, it was to encourage the participation and cooperation of
the people in respect of governmental policies. Finally, the Act provided that the administration was
not to be unduly coerced in terms of its conduct or management, and that the opportunity for the
submission of the opinions of others was to be guaranteed.
It would appear, therefore, that the increase in legislative activity over the past three decades
providing for increasing opportunities and guarantees of recourse against state actions was
accompanied by increases in practical terms of the number of cases filed and settled by the courts
in respect of administrative actions. The Constitution, together with the three major pieces of
legislation referred to above, defined limits on state power in an effort of prevent arbitrary and
non-transparent administrative action, and to limit the discretion of individual bureaucrats. In terms
of the nature of the law, these legal restraints on state actions would infer the emergence of
developmental bureaucratic law. Further, the provision of guarantees of the rights of individuals to
challenge unacceptable state conduct through the courts may even imply a movement towards more
rights-based law. Again, data concerning the number of administrative law ca es considered over
the past three decades indicate the positive impact of these laws in terms of the increasing
opportunities for and willingness of individuals to seek recourse against the state.
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2.A.4. Laws governing Access to Markets: Foreign Investment
As outlined in the previous section, the Foreign Investment Encouragement Act was enacted
in 1960, and was later followed by the Foreign Capital Inducement Act (FCIA) of 1966. In
accordance with the inherent nature of foreign investment regulation, government legislation in this
area has applied at the national, rather than provincial level. The Foreign Capital Inducement Act
(FCIA) of 1966 was enacted in response to the problems caused by floods of foreign commercial
loans coming into the country under unfavorable conditions. The Korean government then began to
pay considerable attention to the quality as well as the quantity of this foreign capital, and
encouraged public loans with low interest rates and long repayment periods, as well as foreign direct
investments.39 These changes in the basic economic policy of the Government were reflected also
in the legislation of the times, and accordingly, the FCIA was substantially revised in 1973, and the
Law concerning the Inducement and Management of Public Loans was enacted. The FCIA, together
with other tax laws, provided substantial tax and other incentives to foreign investors, foreign
invested enterprises (FIE) and technology-pr viding sources. In 1970, the temporary Special Law
concerning Labor Unions and Labor Dispute Adjustments of Foreign Invested Enterprises was
enacted in an effort to regulate and restrict union activities in FIEs.
Initially there were few or no regulations concerning foreign investment which defined
eligible businesses and foreign equity ratio and control. Foreign investment even in sensitive infant
industries was allowed, resulting in substantial hardship to local small and medium companies.
Moreover, joint venture agreements executed during this period contained terms and conditions
significantly unfavorable to the Korean parties. Thus, in 1973, amendments to the FCIA were passed
which provided for sectoral preferences (manufacturing, etc.), equity ratio (50k maximum), and the
minimum size of investments.40
The 1980s witnessed increasingly heavy pressure from the United States, Canada and other
trading partners for the opening of Korean markets for goods and services. It is partly as a result of
this pressure that the Korean government has implemented a variety of market opening measures.41
Accordingly, in 1983 the FCIA was completely rewritten, and several new laws concerning foreign
direct investment and foreign loans were also incorporated, comprehensively covering such matters
as FDI, foreign public and commercial loans, and technology inducement. As one scholar notes:
"After the second oil shock of the late 1970s, the Korean government declared open international
economic relations and liberalized foreign investment. The rewriting of the FCIA was a direct result
of this liberalization policy."42 These 1983 amendments, in conjunction with the four subsequent
amendments to the FCIA, helped liberalize various forms of foreign investment in Korea. At the
same time, the consequent increase in the standard of Korean economic development, which had
been enhanced by the new legislation, in turn enabled further liberalization of Foreign Investment
Regulations in harmony with the global trend towards international liberalization. As a result,
provisions concerning such things as the requirements for the entry of foreign investment into Korea,
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the business sectors in which investment was allowed, and approval procedures were repealed or
standardized in accordance with international practices.43 By virtue of the 1983 FCIA, restrictions
on the maximum foreign equity ratio and repatriation of investment were abolished. Furthermore,
the rewritten FCIA expressly provided for the equal treatment of foreign investors and foreign
invested companies vis-a-  purely local investors and companies. However, in light of the
recognition by the government that tax benefits were not necessarily critical factors in inducing
foreign direct investments, the eligible scope and size of tax benefits given to foreign investors and
foreign invested companies was reduced.44
In 1994, Foreign Investment Stimulation Measures were introduced in an effort to boost
direct foreign investment in Korea. Further, the Enforcement Decree and Working Rules were
amended in order to implement these amendments, which greatly simplified foreign investment
procedures.45
Prior to 1984, foreign investment could only be undertaken within the confines of the
"positive list system", in accordance with which only those types of foreign investment specifically
listed were permissible. However, 1984 heralded the introduction of the Negative List system under
the FCIA, whereby all foreign investment is in principle allowed unless explicitly prohibited by
identification in the "Negative List". This list uses the Korean Standard Industrial Classification
(KSIC) categories established by the Economic Planning Board, and is reviewed periodically with
the stated view of gradually removing currently restricted industries from the list as the Korean
economy matures.46 In addition, the Korean government sometimes issues guidelines establishing
special criteria for applications to invest in certain restricted industries. Although generally, foreign
investors are permitted to form manufacturing joint ventures or wholly owned subsidiaries in Korea
relatively free from regulation, apart from certain limited products, more restrictions apply to
investments in service sectors, although even this market has gradually been opening up. Further
liberalization of the service markets is expected to occur in the wake of agreements coming out of
the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations on services.47 Moreover, in addition to the restrictions
imposed by the Negative List, foreign investment may also be subject to certain limitations or
restrictions under special laws designed to protect and promote small and medium-sized i ustries.48
Within the businesses classified in accordance with the Korean Standard Industrial
Classification (KSIC), 1148 of the 1195 businesses classified are eligible for foreign investment. The
remaining 47 categories which do not permit foreign investment relate to areas such as public
administration, defense industry, schools, and political parties. Even foreign investment in the
Negative List industries, which is prohibited in principle, may be possible if certain approval criteria
prescribed in the Negative List have been satisfied by the foreign investor. Accordingly, those
businesses not listed are, by inference, liberalized ones which are open to foreign investors.49 As of
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January, 1994, only 183 of the 1148 businesses eligible for foreign investment were included in the
Negative list. The Korean government periodically establishes special criteria for investments in
these restricted industries. Further, the government announced a 5 year liberalization plan in the early
1990s, prescribing the time frame under which the restricted businesses will be automatically
liberalized for foreign investment.
The practical consequences of the continuing trend of Parliamentary legislation towards the
promotion of further liberalization has encouraged greater economic development, and as the
standard of economic development rises, this in turn allows further liberalization of the Foreign
Investment Regulations. Thus we can see positive interaction between the law itself and economic
development. These developments have resulted in a positive assessment of Korea's new investment
environment by foreign governments, FIEs and other institutions. At the working level conference
of the Korean-American Dialogue for Economic Cooperati n held in March, 1995, the United States
gave full support to the efforts made by the Korean government to improve the investment
environment.50 Against this backdrop, the Korean government will continue in its endeavors to
improve the foreign investment climate, and to this end, the Foreign Investment Division of the
Ministry of Finance and the Economy produced a "Foreign Direct Investment Environment
Improvement Plan" in September 1995, which assessed the performance of the policies to date, and
outlined specific steps for the further liberalization of investment and its future direction. Further,
in light of the policy of "segyehwa", i.e. globalization, which has long been the platform of the
present administration, the September Report was followed in November by the publication of a
special report by the Korean government entitled "Actions toward Liberalization". This report
contained the liberalization measures planned by the Korean government in pursuit of their policy
of globalization, in particular specifying the opening plan for the investment sector, according to year
and sector, until the year 2000. These Improvement Plans can be seen as examples of Korea's plans
for further liberalization, and as an indication of her participation in the world trend towards the
increasing liberalization of foreign investment.
Current discussion of foreign investment in Korea has revolved around the OECD's
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which aims at reaching a high level of market
liberalization within its member states in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI). As Korea is
expected to become party to this agreement, which will probably be implemented by the end of 1997,
she will also become subject to the obligation to realize this high standard of liberalization in respect
of FDI. Thus, in addition to the policy direction of the Korean government to liberalize the economy
further, Korea must in any event harmonize her domestic economic situation with the market
liberalization schedule which will be submitted to the OECD, as a possible signatory to this
multilateral agreement.
2.A.5. Sectoral laws: Laws relating to Industrial Policy
In the early 1960s, the government of former President Park initiated the five-year Economic
Development Plan. In addition to enacting the Foreign Capital Inducement Act in order to import
capital goads from abroad, the same government in the mid-1960s nacted several laws to promote
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specific key industries, most of which were export-ori nted heavy or chemical industries. The
government itself selected such industries which included, but were not limited to, mechanical
engineering, shipbuilding, electronic engineering, steel, oil and chemical industries.
Subsequently, in the late 1960s, several laws were consecutively enacted in an effort to
promote specific industries. These laws included:
Mechanical Engineering Industry Promotion Act (1967)
Ship-building Industry Promotion Act (1967)
Electronic Engineering Promotion Act (1968)
Steel Industry Promotion Act (1969)
Oil & Chemical Industry Promotion Act (1970)
Non-steel Metal Industry Promotion Act (1970)
The common features underlying these industries included the fact that they were heavy or
chemical industries which were, moreover, so-called "key industries." At the very outset, the
government intervened in the promotion of key industries to quite a significant degree, deciding, for
instance, which sectors of the industries and which specific companies were to be granted
government-conferred benefits and privileges. As time went by, however, the degree of government
intervention lessened. Nonetheless, the operation of these laws was heavily under the influence of
the government until the laws were consolidated into the Engineering Industry Development Act of
1986. Let us take a brief look at the individual laws.
<Mechanical Engineering Promotion Act of 1967>
This law was enacted with the aim of promoting the mechanical engineering industry. Under
this law, the Mechanical Engineering Council was established as an Advisory Council for the then
Minister of Commerce and Industry, and authorized to consider important matters relating to the
promotion of mechanical industry. In accordance with this Act, a person who planned to run a
mechanical engineering company was required to register in order to qualify for specific
governmental subsidies. In particular, mechanical engineering industries were granted governmental
privileges, such as exemption or reduction of tariffs and certain internal taxes. This law was amended
several times until it was consolidated into the Engineering Industry Development Act of 1986. As
noted above, a key feature of such amendments was the lessening of the degree of governmental
intervention. In 1981, for instance, an amendment authorized the administration of the Mechanical
Engineering Promotion Fund by non-government entities.
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<Shipbuilding Industry Promotion Act>
In light of the fact that the shipbuilding industry is related to many other industries,
particularly the supply of intermediate goods for shipbuilding, the Korean government enacted this
law in an effort to promote the shipbuilding industry. It aimed to do this by providing government
subsidies to private firms, none of which could, in the 1960s, afford modern shipbuilding facilities.
Further, the law established the Shipbuilding Industry Promotion Council which was designed to
assist and advise the then Minister of Commerce and Industry in administering the Basic Plan of
promoting the shipbuilding industry. By 1986 the law had been amended twice until it was then
consolidated into the Engineering Industry Development Act. The amendment also resulted in the
lessening of government intervention in the implementation of the promotion plan. For instance, the
1968 amendment enabled private firms to run shipbuilding businesses as soon as they were
registered, as opposed to the original law, which had required them to obtain licenses from the
government.
<Electronic Engineering Industry Promotion Act>
 In December 1967, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry launched the so-called
"Electronic Engineering Industry Promotion Plan." The government subsequently designated the
electronic engineering industry as an export-target industry, with the object of promoting this
industry by providing full governmental support. It was against this background that the Electronic
Engineering Industry Promotion Act was enacted in 1968, which authorized the government to
establish the so-called Electronic Engineering Promotion Fund which was to provide financial
support to the electronic engineering industry. The subsequent 1981 amendment enabled the Korean
Association for the Promotion of the Electronic Engineering Industry to be established. This
association was a non-g vernmental entity which took over many important roles which were
previously played by the government. Nevertheless, this association was still under the supervision
of the then Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
<Engineering Industry Development Act >
During the 1980s, many adverse side-effects of the government-driven economic policy
which had placed unbalanced emphasis on heavy and chemical industries began to emerge in the
Korean economy. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Korean government had pursued a
growth-oriented economic policy supported by governmental subsidies to heavy and chemical
industries. As noted above, the government had selected seven target industries, namely steel,
chemical, non-steel metal, mechanical, electronic, oil & chemical, and shipbuilding. and conferred
certain firms within these industries with various kinds of benefits and privileges, including
protection by governmental entry barriers. However, this sort of governmental protection of certain
firms within selected industries was not without many adverse side-effect . These included the
discouragement of entrepreneurship and monopoly profits belonging to incumbent members of
selected industries. In consequence, even those selected target industries lost their international
competitiveness as a result of the receipt of profits through government-conferred privileges rather
than through their own competition with foreign firms. In light of this situation, the Korean
government was required to lessen the degree of its intervention in the activities of private firms in
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the marketplace. In addition, the government needed to rationalize its industrial policy as a whole,
and it was in an effort to do this that the seven individual laws for the promotion of specific
industries discussed thus far were repealed and consolidated into a unitary law, the Engineering
Industry Development Act of 1986.
The Engineering Industry Development Act of 1986 was designed to streamline the industrial
policy for engineering industries as a whole. Under this Act, the Engineering Industry Development
Council and Industrial Policy Council were established to designate a so-called "R tionalization
Industry". When a certain industry was so designated, the then Minister of Commerce and Industry,
upon seeking advice from the above councils, could design a so-called Rationalization Plan, which
was to be drafted by members of designated industries and implemented under the supervision of
the Ministry. Several provisions of the Engineering Industry Development Act were potentially in
conflict with the new WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Thus, as a
member of the WTO, Korea amended these provisions in order to comply with the new WTO
Agreement. Accordingly, government subsidies under the Act are now conferred only in accordance
with the WTO Agreement.
2.A.6. Financial and Securities Laws
By the year 1960, the Korean financial sector was already possessed of a legal framework
for a modern financial and banking system. Although originally introduced by the Japanese during
occupation (1920-1945), and based on principles imported from the English commercial banking
doctrine, the system was supplemented by Korean legislation in the 1950s which promoted the
principles of market mechanism and free enterprise. The Korean Civil Code of 1958, which was
influenced predominantly by the German Civil Code, contained a number of provisions relating to
secured transactions. In addition, central and general banking statutes were enacted (1950), and
commercial banks privatized in 1957.
The principle objectives of the government at this time was the mobilization of financial
resources and the channeling of capital to strategic sectors such as export industries in order to
promote economic development; this was to be achieved by the placing of the entire financial system
under strict government control. Accordingly, various specialized banks were established throughout
the 1960s which were owned, directed and supervised by the government. In addition, the former
laws enacted by the Japanese relating to the insurance and security sectors were substituted in 1962,
with the enactment of the Korean Commercial Code and the Securities and Exchange Act. Provisions
in the Code relating to the issuance of shares enabled corporations to meet their capital needs more
easily, while the Securities and Exchange Act, which was modeled after its Japanese counterpart
(itself patterned on US law), also facilitated the expansion of the value of stock trading. A shortage
of actual stock, however, despite the boom in trading, led to a crash in the market in 1962.
Subsequently, reforms were introduced by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in 1963, largely
in an effort to strengthen the Korean Stock Exchange. However, it was in this year also that the
securities market entered a long period of depression, resulting in heavy borrowings by companies
from domestic and overseas lenders in an attempt to keep pace with the country's rapid economic
growth. As the debt- quity ratio of manufacturing enterprises increased, many companies were in
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danger of bankruptcy. Realizing that a healthy capital market was essential to meet its economic
development goals, the government passed an Act Relating to Capital Market Support in 1968, with
the aim of promoting the capital market through, inter alia, the c eation of an investment climate
which encouraged corporations to distribute their shares widely among the public. In addition, the
Act established the Korea Investment Corporation (KIC), a government-own d institution which
purported to stabilize securities prices and facilitate the issuance, distribution, and underwriting of
securities. The KIC in fact performed a wide range of functions until its abolition in 1977.
Despite the legislative efforts of the government, the business community as a whole largely
ignored the incentives for going public. Further, as corporations continued to finance their activities
excessively with private loans, the organized banking system was placed under increased pressure.
In an effort to meet these problems, the government introduced the August Third Emergency Decree
in 1972, together with the Going Public Encouragement Act of 1973, which were designed
respectively to decrease private loans and force companies to go public. With the further amendment
of the Securities and Exchange Act in 1973 and 1974, and the issuance of government instructions
regarding shareholdings, public stock distribution started to increase in 1973, and by 1976, the
distribution of shares and bonds, as well as the number of listed companies, had increased
dramatically. In 1977, however, several regulatory measures were introduced in an effort to deal with
the problems caused by the sudden growth of the securities market. These measures included the
establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), amendments to the Corporate
Income Tax Act, and improvement of the system of disclosure.
The introduction of the Securities Transaction Tax in 1979 was an indication that securities
trading had reached major proportions. This was also reflected by amendments to the Securities and
Exchange Act in 1982 and 1983. This period also witnessed a change in government policy, away
from control and intervention, and towards liberalization and internationalization. An increased
number of banks and non-bank financial institutions entered the financial sector; the four largest
commercial banks, of which the government was the largest shareholder, were privatized; financial
deregulation has been pursued. In particular, in 1981, the government announced a plan for the
internationalization of the capital market, and since then has implemented a series of regulations
designed to encourage foreign investment in the Korean securities market, while at the same time
allowing Korean investment in international capital markets. This plan was revised in 1988 in order
to further promote the internationalization of the Korean capital market; this was achieved by
providing new opportunities for non-residents to invest in Korean securities. Further amendments
in 1989 allowed direct participation by foreigners in the Korean stock market, resulting in a steady
increase in foreign capital inflow. To coordinate with the increasing foreign investment, the total
investment ceiling was raised twice, once in December 1994, and again in July 1995.
2.A.7. Laws relating to the Organization of Firms: Corporate Law
Prior to 1962, regulation of corporations took place within the framework of Japanese
commercial law. However, 1962 heralded the enactment of an indigenous Korean commercial Code,
which implemented important changes particularly in the area of Company Law. The revisions
included the introduction of the concept of authorized capital within the context of stock firms; the
establishment of a council system and the concurrent decrease in the powers of the shareholders'
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general meeting and auditors; and an increase in the overall power of the council. In addition, the
amendments purported to counteract the weakening of the shareholders' general meeting and to
protect the shareholders by establishing a maintenance demand system, a representative litigation
system, and by providing the shareholders with access rights to accounting documents. However,
viewed as a whole, these revisions were simply a continuation of the US Corporate Law which was
introduced into Korea following the defeat of Japan, and as such followed the previous 1950
company law.
In 1984, amendments were again undertaken in an effort to adapt to the changing economic
circumstances and the realities of corporate existence that had taken place during the twenty years
since the enactment of the 1960 Commercial Code. Accordingly, the government aimed at
eliminating insolvent firms which had arisen as a result of the abuse of the corporate system,
expediting the improvement of the financial structure and facilitating capital procurement, and
maximizing the efficiency of management and the rational restructuring of the organs of stock firms.
This was to be achieved by providing a structure for a fundamental enterprise law suitable for the
reality of the Korean situation, through the establishment of institutional mechanisms for the purpose
of protecting the investors' interests. Further revisions were undertaken in 1995 in order to simplify
the previously unnecessarily complicated procedure for the establishment of enterprises and to
eliminate any restrictive factors that rendered business management inefficient, thereby providing
elasticity and flexibility, and stimulating general corporate activity. The amendments also guaranteed
protection for the rights of shareholders as a result of the expanding capital market. The ultimate
aims of the 1995 revisions were to maximize the international competitiveness of firms, and simplify
the procedures for the establishment of stock firms.
2.A.8. Laws Governing the Factors of Production: Labor laws
 i) Labor Laws Established During the First Republic of Korea
As outlined above, the 1948 Constitution contained several provisions regarding workers'
rights and labor relations. In particular, the Constitution guaranteed the freedom of choice of
occupation and the right to work, as well as the "three privileges" of workers: the autonomous right
of organization, collective bargaining, and collective action in order to improve working conditions.
However, in response to domestic and overseas pressure, in 1953 Korea passed four central acts that
established a comprehensive legal framework for the protection of workers' rights: the Labor Union
Act, the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act, Labor Relations Commission Act and the Labor Standards
Act. These laws, however, did not adequately protect the rights of workers, and no systemized labor
movement was effectively established. The principal reason for this may lie in the fact that the laws
were not carefully tailored to Korea's unique labor history, the extent of unemployment, or the
general economic conditions then prevailing. Moreover, greater emphasis was placed upon Korean
unification rather than economic development, thereby hindering the development of an industrial
democracy.
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 ii) An Overview of the Changes to the Laws in the 1960s and 1970s
In 1961, former President Park Chung-Hee seized political power after a successful coup
d'etat. During the subsequent transition period, the enforcement of the labor laws enacted in 1953
was suspended and unions were dissolved in an effort by President Park to consolidate his power and
to ensure labor's cooperation with the plan to develop the Korean economy.51 Recognizing the need
for a labor policy, however, Park's government soon modified its stance and was seen as taking the
issue of labor seriously, attempting to place labor law and policy matters along the line with the
long-term economic development plan. Accordingly, the Labor S andards Act was amended in 1961
and other major labor laws were subsequently improved in 1963. These later changes included an
amendment to the Labor Union Act which established Labor-Management Councils in an effort to
enhance cooperation between labor and management. Although the status of these councils was
unclear, and their effectiveness uncertain, they have been recognized by one scholar as representing
a shift from the practice of transplanting rules from abroad toward tailoring laws specific to the
Korean environment.52
The government also legislated to establish a centralized union organization under the
control of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), which the government dominated.
Although fourteen unions were formed under the FKTU, these unions had very little practical
influence given the extent of centralized government control. Under Park, the government also
amended other labor laws in an effort to make the laws reflect the actual practice in the workplace.53
During the 1960s, almost all the efforts of the "Korea enterprise" were directed towards the
development of the national economy, particularly by way of a strategy that was primarily
export-driven.54 By taking advantage of the abundant supply of educated labor, Korea was able to
achieve a fantastically rapid growth in exports during the 1960s and 1970s, especially in the
labor-intensive manufacturing industries.55
Although the legislative amendments were undertaken in an attempt to reflect the Korean
tradition of labor-management cooperation,56 amendments to other statutes strengthened government
intervention, restricted labor disputes, and shaped labor administration with an emphasis on the
"public interests", all in an effort to ensure the effectiveness of Korea's long-term pl n for economic
development by maintaining tight government control over the unions. As a consequence of these
laws and of the rapid industrialization Park spearheaded, labor disputes escalated and government
intervention increased dramatically, resulting in the almost complete cessation of direct negotiations
between labor and management.57
                                                       
51 Jennifer L Porges, "The Development of Korean Labor Law and the Impact of the American System,"
(1991) Comparative Labor Law Journal, vol. 12, 335: 349.
52 Porges (1991) supra, p.349.
53 Ibid.
54 Park Se-Il, "The Role of the State in Industrial Relations: The Case of Kroe ," (1993) Comparative Labor
Law Journal, vol. 14, 321: 322.
55 Ibid.
56 Porges (1991) supra, p.350.
57 Kim, cited in Kathleen B. O'Neill, "Industrial Relations in Korea: Will Korea become another Japan?"
(1991) Comparative Labor Law Journal, vol. 12, 360: 386.
30
While, in fact, the enactment of such legislation actually ensured the effectiveness of Korea's
long-term plans for economic development, the government undertook no measures to ensure the
protection of workers' rights. Thus, despite the growth of the Korean economy during this period,
workers continued to work long hours and under very poor conditions.58 Without a united working
class to demand changes, the labor force had no choice but to cooperate with government policies,
and thus no major advancements took place in terms of a labor movement during the 1960s. In this
respect, issues concerning the labor law did not rise to such a level which would draw national
attention.
During the 1970s, both the political and the economic situations in Korea were not healthy.
This was due in part to the fact that the relationship between South Korea and North Korea had
become worse, and thus national security concerns were given highest priority in Korea. Further, as
a result of the Oil-shock which occurred in 1973, the government fastened its grip over strategic
industries, particularly heavy and chemical industries.59 Workers' rights and labor relations, however,
remained subordinate to the objective of economic development. Indeed, in the name of protecting
national security and bringing prosperity to Korea, the government proclaimed a state of emergency
and enacted new laws, including an amendment to the Constitution.60 The so-called Yushin
Constitution, which was promulgated in December 1972, contained provisions which placed further
restrictions upon workers' rights and the labor movement. For instance, under this legislation, rights
of collective bargaining and collective action were to be protected only where individual statutory
laws so provided (Article 29(1)). Furthermore, the Special Act of National Security in 1971 severely
limited collective bargaining and collective action. Under this strict government control, Korea's
economy continued to grow rapidly as it developed its export-oriented and heavy industries and
relied on a cheap labor force.61 Thus, the 1970s witnessed interference by the Korean government
into labor issues to a significant degree. Although these actions were undertaken by the government
as response to the economic situation and political tensions in Korea at that time, workers' rights
were protected only marginally.62 As a result, the labor movement did not make any great
advancements during this time.
In summary, although the principal labor laws of 1953 remained in force during the 1960s
and 1970s, several amendments were added in response to the economic and political situation in
Korea.63 The state's industrial relations policy was "developmentalism", and thus the major goal was
to provide labor market and labor relations conditions which best promoted rapid economic growth,
i.e. the maintenance of hard-working, disciplined, low-cost labor.64
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 iii) Modern Changes in the Labor Climate of South Korea
In 1979, former President Park was assassinated, and the Fifth Republic was inaugurated in
1980. Amendments to the Constitution also took place, providing not only specifications concerning
workers' rights, but increasing the level of protection for these rights. Further, the major labor laws
were subsequently amended to improve the situation of workers' rights in December 1980, when the
legal restrictions on collective bargaining and collective action were formally lifted.65However, the
government continued to maintain its control over the labor movement, enacting several new pieces
of legislation and amending existing laws to repress the development of union activity.66
The so-called Declaration of Democratic Reforms of June 1987, had a strong impact on
economic distributional justice issues as well as socio-political issues in Korea.67 The Declaration
triggered a series of labor disputes which were perceived as a protest against the long suppression
of workers' rights and the economic policy of the government which placed excessive emphasis on
economic growth rather than distributional justice. Furthermore, since the unrest was supported not
by radical left-wing groups, but by many middle-class workers, it was difficult to suppress or ignore,
and the government felt that it had no option but to concede. This sort of concession to political
protest signified a turning point in the arena of industrial rights in Korea, and marked the beginning
of a series of democratic reforms.68 In the wake of the mounting labor strikes and increased union
activity that followed the above announcement, the government proceeded to amend many of the
existing labor laws in an effort to allow for more democratic industrial relations. In October 1987,
the Constitution was amended once again, strengthening the level of protection for workers' rights.
The new Constitution mandated, for instance, that the government adopt the minimum-wage
protection law. Equal protection for the working rights of women was also declared, and thus with
very limited exceptions, workers' rights of collective action and collective bargaining were now
guaranteed by the Constitution itself; the law is not allowed to place restrictions on basic workers'
rights. Subsequently, major independent labor laws were amended so as to improve the level of
protection of workers' rights.69
Amendments to the Trade Union Law removed several of the obstacles to the formation of
unions, and gave them more strength and bargaining power vis-a-vis management. The Labor
Disputes Adjustment Act was also amended in 1987 in an effort to bring more democratic reforms
to the labor movement, and to limit the ability of the government to interfere with and dominate the
dispute resolution process as it had in the past.70 The significance of these amendments is that they
can be seen as having been instituted as a response and reaction to the demands of labor itself,
reflecting the uniquely Korean experience.71
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 iv) The New Labor Laws
Korean labor legislation as it exists today is far more liberal than the original provisions, and
seems designed to promote a more democratic labor movement. The changes in the legislation
occurred as a reaction to labor demands, reflecting the Korean experience, and were not adopted
from another developed system. For the first time, some scholars suggest, Korea is lessening the gap
between law and practice.72 In practice, the number of management councils has increased and
Korean unions have, in general, followed the requirement that they notify the government and wait
until the cooling-off period expires before commencing a strike.73 However, since 1987, huge labor
disputes have taken place in Korea annually. In 1992, Kim Youngsa , a long-time dissident party
leader, was elected President of Korea, and since that time, his government has tried to negotiate a
balance between the interests of employers and employees. Nevertheless, labor disputes have not
ended. Many argue that as Korean labor laws still provide inadequate protection for workers' rights,
the laws should be amended in order to meet the standards of labor laws of developed countries.
Others are of the opinion that Korean labor laws are biased in favor of the protection of the labor
force, and that this fact, together with too-frequent labor disputes, triggered by progressive labor
unions, has weakened the international competitiveness of Korean industries.
In light of these facts, the Korean government is once again initiating amendments to the
current labor laws. Again, Kim's government is trying to chase two rabbits at the same time -- the
improvement of the international competitiveness of Korean industries and the protection of workers'
rights equivalent to the level of developed countries. This legislative proposal was hotly debated both
inside and outside the legislature until late December 1996. In the end, the ruling party, taking more
than 50 percent of the seats of the congressmen, passed the new law at 6 o'clock in the morning of
December 26, 1996, without even prior notice to other congressmen belonging to opposition parties.
This statute, which is regarded as biased in favor of the interests of the business sector, has created
a significant degree of resistance and protest on the part of the labor movement as well as opposition
parties. A compromise was eventually reached between the ruling and opposition parties to amend
the laws again, although the labor movement itself is not satisfied with this. Generally speaking,
despite the argument that the reforms of the labor laws over the past decade since 1987 have
contributed to the loss of competitiveness on the part of Korean firms, many economists believe that
there are many other additional factors which could have contributed to the downfall of the Korean
economy - thus, it is unreasonable to accusethe labor law reforms alone as having caused an
economic slump. The future of these political and socioeconomic tensions within Korea remains to
be seen.
                                                       
72 Porges (1991) supra, p. 356.
73 Korea Employers' Federation, cited in Porges (1991) supra, p. 358.
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2.B. Major Changes in Legal Institutions and Process
The 1960 amendments to the Korean Constitution for the promotion of the democratization
of the country were short-lived. In May 1962 the government was replaced by a military coup d'etat.
The Constitution ceased to be in force insofar as it was contrary to the Law concerning Emergency
Measures for National Reconstruction, which established a temporary political order until the
adoption of the subsequent Constitution. During the reign of the revolutionary regime, the military
government prepared a new Constitution which was finally promulgated following a referendum in
1962. This Constitution, on the basis of democratic principles, provided for a presidential system
and, instead of a Constitutional Court such as prescribed in the 1960 amendment, retained the
judicial review system in accordance with the United States model. In October 1969, the ruling party
passed a draft late at night in the National Assembly without prior notice to the opposition, providing
for the amendment of the Constitution. This amendment, which was promulgated in October 21,
revised the provisions that allowed for a third term of presidential office.
The 1972 amendment which created the so-called "Yushin Constitution" - meaning
“Revitalizing Reforms”- was followed by the invocation of marshal law and the "10.17 Emergency
Measures" which suspended the operation of the Constitution of the Third Republic. Under the
Yushin Constitution, Korea's governmental system became even more highly centralized than before.
The alleged purposes of these Constitutional changes included firstly, to cope with the preemptive
tasks of national defense and socioeconomic development in the midst of international power
politics; secondly, to open a South-N rth Korean dialogue for the peaceful unification of Korea; and
thirdly, to develop a democracy suitable for Korea, rather than following the practice of imitating
the Western model of a liberal-plu ist democracy without considering Korea's unique possibilities
and limitations.
With the death of President Park, it was generally agreed that the Constitution would have
to be amended to take into account past grievances, especially the effect of the former President's
prolonged dictatorship, as well as the fact that Korea had risen to a new level of economic, social
and political sophistication. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic therefore purportedly aimed at
the realization of a genuine democracy guaranteeing social justice and the well-being of all citizens,
although in fact it retained the authoritarian character of the Yushin syst m.
The 1987 Constitution of the Sixth Republic, designed to eliminate all vestiges of
authoritarianism, was especially significant because it was the first revised Constitution to
emerge from an agreement between both the ruling and opposition parties which participated jointly
in its creation. It was unanimously approved by the National Assembly and received wide public
support in a national referendum. The most striking change was the adoption of a system of direct
election of the President for a single five-year trm, while at the same time curtailing his powers
through the abolition of presidential emergency powers and the presidential authority to dissolve the
National Assembly. The Constitution also extended recognition of fundamental human rights,
restored the right of the National Assembly, with a four-year term, to inspect government offices,
created a more independent judiciary, and applied democratic principles to the economy.
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As can be seen from the nature of the revisions outlined above, they have centered mostly
on the form of government, methods of electing the President and his powers and term of office.
However, many important changes have also taken place with respect to legal institutions and
processes as enunciated in the Constitution, particularly concerning the judicial review system. As
mentioned above, the concept of the Constitutional Court - which had in fact not been established
since the Second Republic - was replaced by the U.S. model of judicial review. Under the Yushin
system as well, this practice was continued, with the establishment under the Constitution of a
Constitutional Committee, which was conferred with the power of judicial review. However, the
Committee had no opportunity to exercise its authority before its abolition, because of action on the
part of the Supreme Court which then had the right to determine whether the problem of the
constitutionality of legislation at issue in a certain case should be reviewed by the Constitutional
Committee. In fact, the Court never allowed the settlement by the Committee of any constitutional
problems. This situation was, moreover, not changed under the 1980 Constitution. However, the
1987 Constitution established a newly revised Constitutional Court completely independent of the
Judicial Branch. Because this institution was created against the background of further progress
towards democratization, symbolized by the "6.29 Movement", its caseload has increased strikingly
in terms of variety as well as in number, and the ratio of determinations of the unconstitutionality
of legislation has also been relatively high.
Looking back on the history of the Judicial Branch, it can be observed that its organization
and competence has undergone various changes. However, the original court structure has remained
basically unchanged in spite of several constitutional changes. The major exception has been an
increase in the numbers of District and Appellate Courts and judges in order to keep up with
population and business increases. The Court Organization Act of 1949 provided for three tiers of
courts: the District Courts, which were courts of original jurisdiction; the Appellate Courts, which
were the intermediate courts of appeal; and the Supreme Court, which had final appellate
jurisdiction. These courts not only had general jurisdiction over civil, criminal, administrative and
other litigious cases, but also had the authority to decide non-contentious cases and other matters
specifically prescribed in individual statutes. Over the years, the lower courts have increased in
number in the following manner:
Table 1: Number of Courts
Year Supreme Court High Court District Court Divisions of the District
Court
1962
1972
1974
1979
1981
1988
1989
1994
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
10(1963)
10
11
11
13
13
14
12(since July)
-
38
-
38
40
41
-
44
Source: Department of Judicial Administration, History of the Courts (1995).
Further, developments in terms of the institutional structure of the court system have
occurred, for example, in respect of the establishment of a special court exercising jurisdiction over
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military criminal cases. In addition, a Family Court has also been established, and an Administrative
Court will be established and operated from 1998 in accordance with the 1994
Court Organization Act.74
The history of commercial arbitration in Korea.75 begins with the enactment of the
Arbitration Statute in 1966. This law was subsequently revised in 1973 upon Korea's ratification of
the New York Convention, in order to bring the law into line with Korea's international obligations.
In accordance with this revision, civil disputes concerning commercial activities may, if the parties
so choose, now be regulated by the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the Korean Commercial
Arbitration Board (KCAB Rules), which were amended in 1981, 1983 and 1989. The KCAB itself
is a private organization established under the authority of the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, and it is statutorily empowered to administer the settlement of any kind of commercial
dispute. In addition, significant developments have taken place with respect to the conciliation
system in Korea, whereby impartial third parties act to bring the parties together for the purpose of
dispute settlement. Major Korean laws which contain provisions for conciliation procedures include,
inter alia, the Civil Conciliation Act, the Environmental Injuries Dispute Adjustment Act, the Land
Reform Act, the Domestic Affairs Adjudication Act, the State Compensation Act, the Labor Dispute
Adjustment Act, the Copyright Act, and the Broadcasting Act. Further, the KCAB Rules provide for
conciliation as an alternative to regular arbitration in commercial disputes submitted to the KCAB.
The Korean system for the resolution of disputes through mediation has also experienced
some changes. The KCAB is, again, empowered to provide counseling and mediation services, while
a number of individual laws contain provisions for mediation. These principal laws include: the
Labor Dispute Adjustment Act and the Environmental Pollution Damages Dispute Adjustment Act.
2.C. Legal Profession
Since 1960, although the number of university law departments has gradually increased, the
rate of those students who passed the National Judicial Exam has continued to be extremely low.
Initially, no quota was set for successful candidates. Instead, it varied from year to year to fill
existing vacancies of judges and prosecutors (from say, five to over 100), who would later go on to
practice as attorneys. From 1971 onward, the number was fixed with some variation. One result of
limiting the number of positions to such a degree has been that it brought about a chronic shortage
of judges and prosecutors, to say nothing of lawyers.76 In 1981, a substantial change was made in the
judicial examination system, whereby the authorized number of candidates was increased to 300, a
number more than sufficient to fill all the vacancies that may develop, thus opening the way for
successful candidates to practice law without first serving as judges or prosecutors.
                                                       
74 As to the history of Constitutional amendments, refer to the following: Young Sung Kwon, Constitutional
Law: A Textbook (Bubmoon Publishing Co. 1994), pp.106-118; Sang Hyun Song[ed.], Korean Law in the Global
Economy (Bakyoung Publishing Co. 1996), pp.197-243 (written by Dae Kyu Yun); Dae Kyu Yun, Law and Political
Authority in South Korea (1990), pp.109-149. As to the history of the Korean courts, refer o the following: Young
Sung Kwon, Constitutional Law: A Textbook (Bubmoon Publishing Co. 1994), pp.1093-1 ; In general,
Department of Judicial Administration, The History of the Korean Court (Department of Judicial Administration,
1995).
75 This part was written with reference to Sang Hyun Song [ed], supra, note 1.
76 Yoon, supra at 113.
36
With the increase of the authorized number of successful judicial examination candidates,
the privileged status of attorneys in legal practice was effectively undermined. Further, although they
had in the past played an insignificant role as critics of legal administration, some attorneys have,
since the 1970s, become active in calling for more democratic processes as political authoritarianism
steadily increased. To the degree that even an authoritarian regime operates under the law, these
attorneys as experts of law have played roles of considerable consequence. They have participated
in efforts for democratization, and sometimes acted as spokesman for the judiciary in criticizing
governmental acts. Such social and political commitment on the part of private attorneys is expected
to grow in scope and depth as their members increase.77
                                                       
77 Yoon, supra at 133.
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Table 2: Judicial Examination Statistics I78
Year Applicants Successful Applicant Rate of Success
1948
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1962
1963
1963
...
1977
1978
1979
1980
625
457
258
711
842
1,141
1,999
2,855
3,414
3,047
3,416
5,557
3,036
3,825
3,450
2,318
...
4,011
4,153
4,506
16
39
21
16
12
17
30
108
51
50
24
31
110
50
56
36
...
80
100
120
141
2.5%
8.1
8.5
2.3
1.4
1.4
1.5
3.7
1.4
1.6
0.7
0.5
2.4
1.6
1.4
1.1
...
2.0
2.4
2.7
Total 101,454 1,902 1.7
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
6,085
7,386
8,450
10,491
10,089
11,708
289
300
300
303
298
300
300
4.7
4.1
3.5
2.9
2.9
2.6
Total 2,090
Legal Education
The epoch of legal education in the 1960s was the establishment of the Judicial Graduate
School, which owed much to the efforts of Paul K. Ryu, then the Dean of Korea's most renowned
College of Law, at Seoul National University. The main purpose of this specialized school lay in the
education of Judicial Trainees who had passed the National Judicial Service Examination. This
school, which was opened in April, 1962 and closed in July, 1970 after its 14th graduation, gave
fresh impetus to Korean legal education. The 508 graduates of this school are now lawyers working
for the Korean Bench, Bar and Government.
                                                       
78 Source: Yoon Dae Kye, supran note 1, pp.114-115.
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Table 3: Judicial Examination Statistics II79
Year Applicant Successful Applicant Rate of Success
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
15,041
16,310
17,131
18,991
19,738
20,737
22,771
20,442
250-300
250-300
250-300
250-300
250-300
290-310
490-510
600
50:1
55:1
57:1
63:1
66:1
67:1
46:1
34:1
Source: Department of Judicial Administration, History of the Courts (1995).
Since the Judicial Training Institute was subsequently established as a replacement in 1971,
as a branch of the Supreme Court, it has hitherto undertaken the task of providing internship courses
for the legal profession. Thus, immediately following the completion of training at the Institute, the
graduates usually become judges, public prosecutors, or practicing lawyers, according to their
individual desires and the results of their performance at the bar examination and the Institute.
Recently, there has been quite substantial debate between the Korean Bar Association and
law professors as to the need (or not) for substantial reforms in the legal education system. These
arguments have thus far only led to several changes such as modifications in the composition of
subjects for the bar examination and the increase in the number of successful applicants.
Judges
The recognition of the necessity for reform is partly due to the lack in numbers of legal
profession, especially in respect of judges. The current distribution ratio of judges to the population
is approximately 1: 42 000. The following table represents the increase in the number of judges since
1960:
Table 4: Number of Judges
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
No. 291 372 413 517 562 794 1028 1212
Source: Department of Judicial Administration, History of the Courts (1995).
This situation of such a low number of judges necessarily gives birth to extremely heavy
caseloads for individual judges as well as low-quality bureaucratic legal services.80 Th  table below
indicates the average caseload per year of individual judges over the past twenty years:
                                                       
79 18 Law and Politics Journal for Bar and Service Examination, March 1997, p.430.
80 Yang Chang Soo, "The Judiciary in Contemporary Society: Korea, 25 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L 303, p.
304-305.
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Table 5: Caseload of Individual Judges
Year Supreme Court High Court District Court Average
1978
1979
440.1 (16)
457.0 (15)
145.7 (75)
165.9 (74)
498.8 (413)
524.1 (413)
444.4 (504)
469.0 (502)
1980
1981
640.0 (13)
514.8 (12)
187.9 (78)
221.9 (84)
614.8 (445)
769.5 (442)
553.3 (536)
678.3 (538)
1982
1983
484.5 (13)
494.8 (13)
213.3 (96)
195.8 (101)
774.4 (463)
722.0 (500)
673.6 (572)
641.3 (614)
1984
1985
466.0 (13)
496.3 (12)
171.8 (111)
165.9 (118)
881.8 (510)
891.4 (583)
715.8 (635)
697.7 (713)
1986
1987
462.1 (13)
495.3 (13)
164.3 (124)
142.8 (138)
842.5 (643)
843.0 (655)
681.0 (780)
677.1 (806)
1988
1989
487.7 (13)
425.7 (13)
128.6 (143)
136.9 (148)
699.0 (701)
653.0 (748)
600.6 (857)
565.7 (909)
1990
1991
639.9 (13)
837.1 (13)
157.9 (151)
182.3 (151)
653.5 (782)
679.4 (802)
574.2 (946)
603.8 (966)
1992
1993
953.1 (13)
1 056.9 (13)
154.6 (164)
187.6 (163)
678.3 (832)
736.8 (835)
596.7 (1009)
652.4 (1011)
  Note : i. The caseload in the table is the average workload of a judge on litigation cases alone.
   ii. The number in parentheses indicates the number of judges.
Source : Department of Judicial Administration, History of the Courts (1995).
Lawyers
The usual career pattern of becoming a practicing lawyer was for Institute graduates to
become judges or prosecutors, and serve in that capacity for several years, then to go to practice
following their retirement from public service. With the steady number of newly hatched lawyers
each year, however, a significant number now choose their career as a lawyer without acquiring prior
practical experience as a junior judge or prosecutor, as their
predecessors had before.81
Further, there has been a remarkable tendency in recent years for lawyers in private practice
to be recruited as judges, although instances of this are still few in number. In addition, there have
been a number of cases where, on the other hand, judges have begun to participate in law firms after
retirement. The table below presents further statistics:
                                                       
81 Choi D.K., "Legal Education in Korea: Problems and Reform Efforts," 29 Seoul Law Journal, (1988)
no.2, pp.104-122.
40
Table 6: Number of the legal profession82
Year No. of judges (Total) No. of attorneys (Newly Admitted)
1960
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
291
371
413
517
562
794
1028
1212
31
16
82
79
72
310
300
291
Source: Department of Judicial Administration, History of the Courts (1995).
In terms of the regulation of the conduct and practice of lawyers, the Lawyers Act, which regulates
such things as qualifications, commencement of work, the authorization of foreign lawyers, duties
and bar associations, was promulgated in 1949 and has since been revised seven times. The Act was
most recently amended in 1993, adopting new provisions applicable to law firms, and introducing
the rules establishing a Lawyers Discipline Committee for the exercise of disciplinary powers over
lawyers.
Judicial Independence
One of the most important characteristics of the legal profession is the maintenance of
judicial independence, even though the degree of independence may vary according to the different
departments. The independence of the courts in particular is concerned principally with the
separation of powers between the legislature and the executive. In Korea, the major challenge of the
courts has been the maintenance of its proper political authority in the conduct of trials, against
encroachment by the executive branch. The management of assignments, promotion, and the tenure
system of judges must also be handled delicately in order to preserve strong judicial independence.
The fundamental democratic principle of the separation of powers is enshrined in the present
Constitution, as too is the principle of judicial independence.83 Thus, judges are Constitutionally
assured independence from interference by any state institution, whether it be legislative, executive
or judicial. Although in the past the Korean judiciary was criticized for not employing its full
autonomous power as guaranteed by the Constitution, and as being susceptible to political pressure
from the executive branch of the government,84 these accusations have ceased to be valid,
particularly in light of recent practice. The court has, over the past few decades, surprised the
executive by handing down bold decisions from time to time as an assertion of judicial
independence. The executive naturally took note. One effect of court actions was to indirectly
illuminate the nature and behavior of the authoritarian regimes of the past.85
                                                       
82 Sources: Dae Kyu Yun, supra note 1, p. 128-129.
83 Ibid., Art. 103.
84 Yoon Dae-Kyu, Law and Political Authority in South Korea (1990), p. 136.
85 Yoon Dae Kyu, supra at 111.
41
With the inauguration of the present government under Kim Young Sam, true independence
on the part of the judiciary seems to have been realized. Personal accounts from judges reveal that
they do not feel constrained by pressure from the executive, thus indicating positive movement away
from extensive state power towards an independent judiciary which can objectively evaluate the
rights of citizens vis-a-vis the state.
Appointment Procedures
The method of appointment of Justices, including the Chief Justice, has undergone alteration
with each constitutional amendment; on the whole, it has been a presidential prerogative. Again,
although executive influence may have, in the past, played a part in matters of appointment, the
reality of the past few years would suggest that it no longer has a direct impact on judicial decisions
rendered in individual cases. Security of Office
The tenure of lower court judges is a fixed period of ten years. Although consecutive terms
may be served, reappointment is required from the Chief Justice, who has exclusive jurisdiction over
these matters. Again, there has been criticism that this leaves the way open for abuse of the system.
Critics have pointed to a number of cases in the past where a judge has been refused reappointment
for political reasons at the end of his term, or has been dismissed without being told the grounds for
dismissal (although the inference has been that it was due to the fact that their decisions had
displeased the executive branch).86 Nevertheless, it must be noted again that this is not the case any
longer. Judges currently on the bench indicate that they do not feel any sense of insecurity in respect
of their position, but rather feel free from pressure either from the executive or the upper judiciary
in terms of rendering judgment.
2.D. Sources of Law and Type of Legal System
For the last several decades, the basic structure of the Korean legal system has been the Civil
Law tradition. In particular, the German civil law has had a heavy influence on private laws
contained in the Korean Civil Code, such as those governing tangible property rights. Moreover, in
dealing with civil cases Korean judges have relied heavily on judicial decisions of the Japanese
courts where the same issues under similar kinds of laws were involved. Recently, there has also
been evidence of the impact of the laws of non-civil law countries. Even in the areas of private civil
law, such as product liability, Korean laws and judicial decisions have started to adopt American
legal theories or principles. Indeed, the Korean government has enacted several special laws modeled
after their counterparts in common law countries.
The strong influence of common law can also be found in legislative activities in the area of
economic regulation. The securities laws of Korea, for instance, are directly influenced by the US
securities laws of 1933 and 1934. The corporate law in general also reflects the impact of American
law in many aspects, particularly in respect of corporate governance. Although not entirely free from
German and Japanese influence, it cannot be denied that Korean competition law also had its origins
in the American model of antitrust law. Further, in the field of consumer protection law, the
government has been attempting to adopt several Common Law types of legislative models, such
as the concepts of class actions and strict liability rules.
                                                       
86 Yoon Dae-Kyu, supra, p.140.
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Korea is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO Agreement requires
member countries to design and enforce many types of trade-related economic laws nd regulations
so as to comply with obligations under the Agreement. Accordingly, substantial economic laws and
regulations of Korea were revised or enacted for that purpose. In this sense, the question of whether
the Korean legal system is based on the Civil Law or Common Law structure becomes somewhat
meaningless, as far as trade-relat d economic laws are concerned.
2.E. Popular Attitudes toward the Legal System
Several studies have been undertaken over the past few decades to investigate the legal
consciousness of the Korean people. A comparison of the results of these surveys, conducted in
1965,87 1972,88 198189 and 199190 respectively, reveal a change in attitudes and interpretation, and
a certain degree transformation of the contemporary legal consciousness of the people.91
A comparative analysis of these surveys in tabular form is presented below:
                                                       
87 By Professor Hahm Pyong-Choon.
88 By Professor Lim Hy-Sup.
89 By Professor Lee K un-Shik.
90 By the Korean Legal Research Institute (KLRI).
91 See generally: Choi Chongko, "Traditional Legal Culture and Contemporary Legal Consciousness in
Korea," Justice (Korean Legal Center), vol. 27, no. 2, 1995.
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Table 7: Surveys of Legal Consciousness92
Question prof.Hahm (1965) Prof. Lim (1972) Prof. Lee (1981) K.L.R.I. (1991)
If you are involved
in a dispute, what
would your reaction
be to the suggestion
to solve the dispute
by legal means?
32.6%-good or
neutral
45.3% - good 49.1%-desirable or
reasonable
50.8%-unpleasant
Do you agree that
someone who lives
successfully, but
violates the law, is a
man of ability?
52.9$-It would be
stupid to live by the
law
43.3% - yes 31.9% - agreed
Do you think law is
well observed in
Korean society?
82.4% - no
17.6% - yes
If a law suppresses
people unjustly,
what would you do?
11.5%-be satisfied
with what is
provided for
74.9%-no other
choice but to abide
by the law
49.6%-demand its
amendment
Do you consider
legislation passed
by the National
Assembly as law
made by the
people?
74.4%-agree
14.4%-disagree
46% - yes
Do you think power
and wealth affect
the outcome of
court judgements?
Approximately
33.3% - yes
55.8% - yes 94% - yes
Have you ever
experienced
difficulties because
legal terms were
difficult or
unfamiliar to you?
66.7% - yes 79.5% - yes
 i) Increase of Legal Consciousness
In response to the question: "If you were involved in a dispute, and the other party suggested
solving it by legal methods, what would your reaction be?", the results of the 1965 survey indicated
that 32.6 % would feel "good" or neutral about the issue. By 1981, the responses to a similar question
had increased to 45.3 % feeling good/neutral, and in 1991, 49.1% replied that such means were
"desirable" or "reasonable". It would appear, therefore, that the resolution of disputes through formal
legal mechanisms is more acceptable than it was in previous years. In other words, negative attitudes
towards resolving disputes by legal means have gradually been replaced by positive ones.
In addition, the majority of the respondents of the 1991 survey believed that it was helpful
to know a lawyer when it came to solving legal problems, thereby indicating an advancement in the
area of dispute resolution toward a more legal realm. Moreover, the results of the survey infer that
                                                       
92 Source: Ibid., 135- 7.
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Korean people possess an increased competency in dealing with the law, and while they believe that
legal proceedings are unpleasant, they would solve a dispute through the legal system when
necessary. Such developments may be advantageous for realizing the rule of law in Korea.
When faced with the question: "Do you think that those who live successfully even though
they violate the law are men of ability?", 31.9% of the respondents in 1991 agreed, while 68.1%
reacted negatively to the concept of violating the law. This may contrasted with the 1972 survey
results, wherein 52.9 % of respondents answered that "It would be stupid to live in accordance with
the law," and the affirmative response of 43.3% of the respondents to a similar question in the 1981
survey. Thus, it appears that the number of those who agreed with violating the law has decreased
over time, and thus Koreans may now be inferred to be more critical of law-breaking.
 ii) Negative Evaluation of Observation of the Law in Reality
In spite of the increasing "anti-illegality" sentiment, 82.4% of Korean respondents in 1991
felt that law was not effectively abided by in the reality of Korean society. When asked to identify
the cause of this failure to observe the law, 33.2% thought that it was because legal procedures were
complicated and subject to sudden change; 24.1% answered that it was due to the fact that the law
was not strictly enforced. Thus, over half of the people surveyed were critical of the legislative and
executive organs. Of the remainder, 19.9% claimed that it because law was unfair; 12.6% felt that
it was due to the fact that it was more disadvantageous to those who did abide by the law; 10.4%
thought it was because other methods available that were more convenient. Thus, it is possible to see
a contradiction between the belief that violation of the law is wrong and the practice in fact of poor
observation of the law.
When asked to identify the "worst violators" of the law, 61.8% chose politicians; 15.6%
referred to "entrepreneurs"; and 11.0% identified public servants. This would seem to indicate a lack
of law-abiding spirit on the part of the leaders of Korean society, and strong criticism of these leaders
by the ordinary citizens. In response to the question asking them to specify how they would react to
a law which suppresses people unjustly, 49.6% asserted that they would demand its amendment, and
11.4% insisted that they would not abide by the law because it was unjust. In contrast, 17.7% felt that
the law should nevertheless be followed because although unjust, it was still the law; 21.3% said
they would abide by the law for fear of punishment. In other words, only 39% of the respondents said
that they would obey even unjust laws. This is in sharp contrast to the results of the 1981 survey, in
which 74.9% of the respondents felt that they had no choice but to abide by the law.
 iii) Negative Attitude Towards Authority
The 1991 survey revealed a strong negative attitude toward legislative and executive organs
in Korea. When asked whether they considered legislation passed by congressmen as "law made by
the people", 46% of the respondents answered somewhat positively (15.2%: "yes"; 30.8%: "to some
degree"). At the same time, 54% responded negatively (40.6%: "not particularly"; 13.5%: "never").
In contrast, responses to similar questions asked in 1972 indicated that 74.4% agreed, while 14.4%
disagreed. Thus, it is clear that respect for legislative organs has fallen sharply over the past two
decades.
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In response to a question asking whether they thought that power and wealth would affect
the outcome of a judicial decision, an overwhelming 94.2% answered in the affirmative; 43%
insisting that such influence was "absolute." This may be contrasted with the results of the 1965, in
which, when asked who they thought would win in a litigation between a rich provincial governor
and a poor farmer, only a third thought that the governor would win. However, in 1981, 55.8% of
respondents felt that they would personally be the only ones to incur losses if involved in a dispute
against the powerful and wealthy. As a result, one may infer that there was a pervading distrust of
the judicial system in the early 1990s, which indicate public doubt as to the independence of the
judiciary. When asked whether they had ever experienced difficulties reading laws because of the
difficulty or unfamiliarity of the legal terms used, 79.5% of the respondents in 1991 answered in the
affirmative (7.8% said "no"; 12.7% had had no opportunity to read the law). A similar question in
1981 evoked an affirmative response of 66.7% (22.5% and 10% respectively). These results would
seem to suggest that the majority of respondents still experience difficulty in understanding laws,
thereby implying that the efforts on behalf of the Korean government to make law easy for citizens
to understand has met with little success.
In summary, the comparison of the studies suggests that firstly, positive attitudes towards the
resolution of disputes by legal means have gradually increased. Secondly, although violation of the
law is increasingly regarded as unacceptable, Koreans generally do not consider law to be effectively
observed in modern society. Thirdly, negative attitudes toward the legislative and executive organs
of the Korean legal system have gradually intensified over the past three decades.
 iv) Interpretation and Evaluation
In attempting to evaluate the state of legal consciousness in Korea, there are obviously two
ways of understanding the situation. One is to view legal consciousness in Korea as a reflection of
strongly held cultural values, especially Confucianism. This view was held by Professor Hahm,
based on his study conducted in the 1960s. He concludes that as the traditional legal culture in Korea
is alegalistic, Korean people traditionally prefer the methods of compromise and conciliation to
dispute settlements in the courts. According to Hahm's theory, the legal system should be looked
upon not as a tool for economic and cultural development, but primarily as a means by which to cure
social injustices. Alternatively, one may view the situation not from a cultural, but from a political
perspective, as is done by the later surveys. These studies argue that the tendency to avoid the
settlement of disputes by official means in Korea is partly due to a strong distrust of the authoritative
governmental regimes of the 1960s and 1970s, together with the very high cost of using the judicial
process resulting from the monopolization of the system by lawyers.
The 1974 research conducted by Professor Lim concluded that from a cognitive perspective,
the morality and political nature of the law were considered as important as its social function, while
the penal-punitive aspect and control function of the law were emphasized more than the
civil-contractual aspect or social reform function. Secondly, the study concluded that the degree of
legal alienation on the part of the average citizen was considerably high, while there was quite a low
degree of confidence in law's validity and fairness. Lastly, in light of skepticism regarding the
validity of the law, legal competence was at a relatively low level.93 In addition to these conclusions,
the study also classified "legal behavior" into "observant", "manipulative", "subject" and "avoidance"
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types, and concluded that wealthy, educated and young people were apt to be observant and
manipulative, while women, the aged, and those having a low level of income and education tend
mainly to be covered by the subject and avoidance types.94 I  general, however, the study concluded
that the manipulative, subject, observant and avoidance types of legal behavior were almost equally
distributed among Koreans without any one of these types being predominant.95
The 1991 survey by the Korean Legislative Research Institute demonstrated the topology of
the legal consciousness of Korean people in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was during this later
half of the 1980s that Korean society had entered a dramatic period of democratization, resulting in
the formation of a participant civil culture and sharp change of values. The results of the KLRI
survey reflected a changing society which had become democratic and rational, and in which the
desire for participation had become strong. The resultant impact of these changes on the national
legal consciousness modified the conclusions drawn from results of the previous research which had
diagnosed the national legal consciousness by assuming the Confucian tradition as the Korean view
of values.96 The results of the 1991 KLRI survey demonstrated that, although the “law-abiding spirit”
of the people did not appear to be strong, and negative views of the legislative and executive had
deepened as compared to the previous surveys, nevertheless the increase in legal awareness had
spread and social consciousness in respect of legal rights had grown. The tendency to choose the law
as a means for settling disputes and the critical opinion of violators of the law can be seen as an
indication of the trend towards the realization of the rule of law and the growth of legal
consciousness in Korea.97
As we approach the end of the 1990s, the trend towards the realization of the rule of law has
continued, and the demands for responsible and accountable executive and legislative branches of
government are being fulfilled. Indeed, the current atmosphere within Korea seems to be one of a
general law-abiding people with a strong sense of national legal consciousness.
3. Economy in 1960 and major changes 1960--1995
 In 1960, Korea was one of the poorest countries in Asia, with a very low industrial base and
dismal growth prospects. But there followed thirty five years of sustained economic development.
The average annual real rate of growth of commodity output in the whole period is estimated to be
about 4%, which probably translates into an overall real rate of growth of around 2%. Exports, which
had been only $30 million in l960, grew so rapidly that Korea ranked as the l3th largest exporter in
the world by l993.98 By l995, Korea was classified as an upper middle income country by the World
Bank99, with a per capita income of $US 7,660 in l993 dollars. It is therefore no surprise that Korea's
dramatic growth performance has been termed a "miracle."
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For purposes of understanding the rapid, uninterrupted growth of the Korean economy, we
partition the 1960-95 period into five subperiods as identified by the policy regime and review major
economic policies and growth during each subperiod. We start with the "initial conditions" in 1960
by overviewing the developments in the pre-1960 p riod.
3.1. The Initial Conditions: The Pre-1960 Period
After the end of the Second World War came the partition of the country, with subsequent
dislocations occurring at least until l949. But there had been considerable progress toward
reconstruction by l949-50. Available data suggest that production by l949 had virtually doubled the
l946 level. Several significant reforms were initiated that improved the foundation for later growth.
In particular, the lands previously owned by the Japanese were distributed in a far-reaching land
reform program in l947. The educational system also was reformed in ways that enabled a greatly
increased fraction of children to attend elementary school and continue their education. In 1948, the
Korean government and its Constitution was established, and many laws began to be enacted to
provide institutions necessary to support a market economy. Properties reverted from Japanese
ownership were disposed: 36 out of 89 reverted companies with over 300 employees were either sold
or transformed into state-run enterprises. Most of the state-owned companies (then 54 in total)
including commercial banks were privatized during the years 1951-54.
The Korean War swept aside much of what was achieved up to 1950. The devastation that
resulted from the war put Koreans back where they had been in l945 or worse. By l953, it is
estimated that net commodity product per capita in real terms was about 27% less than in l940.100
The war and the reconstruction efforts afterwards were inevitably accompanied by the foreign
exchange shortage, and foreign aid in the form of capital or raw material contributed significantly
to solving this problem. The incentives for the Korean officials to maintain an overvalued currency
were considerable, as that increased the number of dollars received for the won advances. In
addition, policy makers wanted to encourage industrialization through import substitution and, as
such, were willing to restrict imports of goods that were deemed competitive with domestic
production. When these three forces of foreign exchange shortage, motivation to maximize dollars
per won, and import substitution were operative simultaneously, the result was one of the most
chaotic foreign exchange regimes in the world at that time, with multiple exchange rates applicable
to different categories of exports and imports.101 Import licensing was used to contain large excess
demand for imports, despite the fact that the average rate of surcharge on imports was over 50%.
Corruption in allocating licenses was rampant as the domestic value of an import license was
extremely high. As of the late l950s, the structure of production was distorted heavily toward import
substitution activities.
The growth of the Korean economy in the l950s was disappointing, especially for an
economy in the reconstruction phase where growth should have been be relatively rapid. Real GNP
is estimated to have grown at rates of 5.5, 5.4, 0.4, 7.7, and 5.2% in the years starting in l954, but
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that growth was achieved despite high rates of inflow of foreign aid which financed virtually all
investment activity. The share of exports in GDP was very small, and failed to grow. Exports were
$39 million in l953, $17.6 million in 1955, $25 million in 1956, $l6.4 million in l958, and $32
million in 1960. Primary commodities accounted for between 65 and 85% of the total exports, with
manufactures consisting largely of processed primary commodities. Whereas exports accounted for
3.4% of GDP or less, imports were generally more than l3% of GDP, and the large current account
deficits were financed mainly by foreign aid. Indeed, foreign aid financed between 69 and 86% of
imports in each year between l954 and l958, and represented over 8% of GDP in l958. The wholesale
price index, which stood at 11.8 on a l965 base in December l953, had risen to 32.3 by mid-l955, and
rose to 42.5 by l957. While the rate had slowed down somewhat, it was fuelled by government
deficits which were not fundamentally addressed until l958.
Thus, although there had been some recovery from the lows immediately after the Korean
War by 1958, Korea's per capita income was still the third lowest in Asia, the inflation rate was
among the highest in the world, and other indicators of economic policy, well-being, and
performance were similarly dismal. The outlook for growth was very poor, as net savings as a
percentage of GDP were very close to zero and the multiple exchange rate system chaotic. When,
in l957, the US announced that aid flows would not increase and would instead be allocated simply
to maintaining consumption levels, it became evident to policy makers that the situation was clearly
desperate. A stabilization program was announced in the second half of l957. There is little evidence
that policy makers viewed the adoption of the initial stabilization program as being anything more
than an anti-inflationary program. However, the stabilization program represented a first step away
from the chaotic policies of the previous years. It was the first attempt of policy makers to grapple
with the underlying difficulties of the economy which were then perceived to center on the rate of
inflation, the high black market p emia and value of import licenses, and other phenomena
associated with imbalances. That program brought about a significant decline in the rate of inflation
(wholesale prices actually fell between l957 and l958) and increases in the real exchange rate. The
latter removed some of the pressures of excess demand from the import regime. Fixed investment
in real terms rose somewhat in l959 and l960, but still represented only ll.6 and ll.5% of GDP
respectively.
The period from mid 1957 to early 1960 could thus be characterized as the "stabilization"
period. The degree of excess demand within the economy was reduced, and prices (especially of
foreign exchange) undoubtedly played somewhat more of a role in allocating resources. But growth
was very slow and the underlying prospects for growth were still poor especially if one took into
account the prospect of declining foreign aid as a source for financing investment. The early part of
l960 might have witnessed more of an economic response to the changes brought about under the
stabilization program, but there was a change of government by protests against the reported results
of the April l960 reelection of Sygman Rhee, who resigned after protests mounted. There followed
a weak government led by Chang Myo  (elected in July l960), but by all accounts it was unable to
capture the reins of government.
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3.2. 1961- 973, The Reform Period and The Miracle Years
In May l96l General Park Chung Hee came to power, first as leader of a military junta and
after the elections of l964 as President. From the beginning, he made clear that his objective was
economic growth. Changes in economic policy followed rapidly. In particular, the military
government decided against continuing the policies of import substitution which had been followed
in the l950s.
Several measures were taken to encourage exports, including:
* export-import link system which entitled exporters to automatic import rights,
* "wastage allowance" under which exporters were entitled not only to import needed
    inputs for producing for export, but an additional amount,
* export subsidies, stated as a particular number of won per dollar of export earnings,
* extension of preferential interest rates to exporters,102
* export targets, with the monthly meetings chaired by President Park and attended by
   Cabinet ministers held to review export performance and remove bottlenecks.
The stabilization program of the late 1950s and subsequent changes had enabled the
government to rationalize importing with several categories of imports. An "automatic approval"
category had been introduced and expanded, which, combined with the greatly depreciated real
exchange rate, liberalized the import regime over the following years. The combination of a
depreciated and more unified real exchange rate, liberalization of import licensing, and export
incentives resulted in a major shift and reduction in the bias of the regime toward import-competing
industries.
The reforms of the l960-63 period thus reduced the bias of the trade regime somewhat and
provided some trade liberalization. However, as depicted by Kim (1991), "...most of the export
promotion measures, including the export-import link system adopted in l963, had the characteristic
of ad hoc measures to offset the disincentive effect of an overvalued won currency on exports..." The
reforms of l964 consolidated and unified the partial and ad hoc measures of earlier years, laying the
foundation for the outer-ori nted trade and development strategy pursued over the next several
decades. These reforms included:
* a large devaluation and a shift to a unified, floating exchange rate in early 1965,
* an intensification of export (especially credit) incentives,
* significant reforms of the budgetary process which resulted in a major reduction in
   the fiscal deficit and in inflationary pressures,
* a doubling of interest rates on bank deposits and loans (which, with reduced inflation,
   resulted in a shift to positive real interest rates).
This policy regime in effect provided uniform incentives to induce increased exportable
production, leaving individual producers free to decide which industries and products were most
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promising. The effective exchange rate became uniform for all nontraditional exports by 1964, and
there was no effort to discriminate against different commodity categories or to target any particular
lines of exporting activity. Policy, in that sense, was geared toward achieving rapid growth through
expansion of exports, without regard to their type. Policy changes after 1965 were more in the nature
of removing obstacles to additional export and growth rather than fundamental shifts in direction.
There also came other important policy shifts, all of which consolidated the dominant
position of the government in managing the economy. Nationalization of several key industries was
one of the major steps toward government initiative. Nationalization of the once privatized
commercial banks was particularly significant, because it enabled the government to fully control
the creation and supply of credit. For decades, the government's control over banks was an essential
element in the government-led economic growth, and much of the investment financing became
subject to government approval. As long as access to credit was the key to success in business, the
private sector was willing to be subordinate to the directives of the government. In this way, the
so-called "policy loan" became a symbol of government intervention.
In l967, a major import liberalization was undertaken. The positive list system under which
only items specifically listed could be imported was changed to a much more liberal negative list
system. The number of prohibited items fell from 26,l48 in the first half of l967 to 2,6l7 in the
second half, while automatic approval items rose from 3,760 to 30,000. Kim's index of the overall
degree of liberalization of imports (including both quantitative restrictions and tariffs) moved from
35.8 in l965 to 59.0 in l967.103 Virtually all intermediate goods had relatively low actual
tariffs-ranging from l.6% for transport equipment to a high of l4.4% for some intermediate products.
Fiscal policy was managed in much less expansionary way after the fiscal reforms of l964.
In consequence, inflation proceeded at a slower rate. Wholesale prices rose an estimated l0% in l965,
8.8% in l966 and 6.4% in l967. Thereafter, wholesale price increases stayed in the range of 6.7 to
9.2% in every year except l972 (when the inflation rate rose to l3.8%) until l974 and the aftermath
of the oil price increase.
It was in the l964-70 period that Korea was able to begin accessing private international
capital markets, and to supplement domestic savings with foreign capital. The current account deficit
rose to $623 million by l970, equaling l0.l% of GDP. Foreign savings accounted for more than a
third of total savings in each year during the period. Since exports grew rapidly, however, the debt
service ratio did not rise appreciably. Despite the importance of private capital flows, there was little
foreign direct investment. Over the period from l967 to 1971, foreign direct investment accounted
for only l.l% of fixed capital formation and 4.2% of all capital inflows.104
The reforms of the early 1960s were followed with a short lag by a sharp increase in the rate
of export and economic growth. Over the l963-73 decade, exports grew at an average annual rate of
over 40%, while real GDP growth was the highest in the world, averaging l3% annually. Exports
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increased steadily from $119 million in l964 to $455 million in l968 and $3,225 million in l973(See
Table 1). For the l963-75 period, it is estimated that 40% of all growth in manufacturing was based
on exports, while 9% was associated with import substitution, and the remainder with the growth
of domestic demand. There is little doubt that this change in relative contributions and growth
performance as between exports and import substitution was a consequence of the changes in relative
incentives arising from the policy reforms carried out starting with the l958 stabilization program.
One consequence was the change in the structure of Korean industry. The share of
manufacturing in GDP rose from ll.9% in the early l960s to 34.3% in l973-75, with an average
annual growth rate of manufacturing value added of l8.4% at constant prices. Although food,
beverages and tobacco was still the largest manufacturing sector, its share of manufacturing value
added had fallen from 44.6% in l953-55 to 34.9% in l960-62 and to 2l.5% in l973-75. The most
rapidly growing sectors had been leather products, chemicals and petroleum products, clothing and
footwear, and metal products. The slowest growing manufacturing industries were printing and
publishing, and food, beverages and tobacco. The reduction of the population in rural areas and the
percent of GDP originating in agriculture had been at a more rapid rate than any country had
experienced. Whereas primary commodity production had accounted for 5l.3% of GDP in l953-55
and 46.7% of GDP in l960-62, it accounted for only 25.8% of GDP by l973-75. Manufacturing, by
contrast, had increased its share from 5.9% in l953-55 to 9.4% in l960- 2 and 27.2% in l973-75.
By l973, real per capita income in Korea was more than double its level of the mid l960s, and
policies to encourage sustained rapid growth appeared to be well established. The economy had
already been transformed, and growth momentum seemed assured in the
absence of major policy reversals.
3.3. 1973-79, The Oil Crisis and the HCI Drive
In the early l970s, policy makers, believing that the Korean economy had really "taken off"
and was ready to shift away from labor-intensive, light industries, announced the Heavy and
Chemical Industry(HCI) Plan in l973. Not long after the HCI plan was announced, the first oil price
increase shocked the entire international economy. Korea, entirely dependent on oil imports, was
among the economies most profoundly affected. The oil price increase appeared to reaffirm the
importance of the HCI Plan as it had been seen as import substitution,105 although it was always
anticipated that HCI industries would eventually export. In response to the oil price increase, policy
makers also began encouraging exports of construction services, especially to mid- ast countries.
Firms providing those services, as well as firms undertaking HCI activities, were directly encouraged
by the government.
The HCI drive represented a significant deviation, if not departure, from the export-o iented
policies of the l960s. It was never intended to displace earlier exports, and HCI industries were
expected to export eventually. But, unlike the l960s when all exports were promoted within the
context of uniform export subsidies, credit preferences, and tax arrangements, the HCI drive targeted
specific industries and specific activities. The policy consisted not only of a plan announcing which
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industries were expected to grow and by how much, but of a list of projects to be implemented. And
considerable pressure was put on individual firms to undertake projects suggested to them.
Over the period from l97l, the share of HCI in output was planned to rise from 35.2% to 5l%,
while the share of HCI in exports was to go from l9.l% to 60%. The HCI plan spelled out specific
projects to be undertaken in the following industrial sectors, with the anticipated shares of each
sector in HCI investments indicated in parentheses: steel(22.7),non-ferrous metals(3.6),
machinery(22.8), shipbuilding(8.0), electronics(l2.7), and chemicals(22.8). Investment was to
increase rapidly under the HCI drive, largely because those industries were so capital using. The
share of HCI in investment rose from 56.5% in l970-71 (with a 43.5% share for light industry), to
74.2% in l976 and 82.5% in l978. Moreover, total investment grew very rapidly, at an average annual
rate of l4.7% in l976, 26.6% in l977 and 40.5% in l978. The estimated net capital stock in the
chemical industries doubled between l972 and l977, and doubled again by l983; that of the
non-electric and electric machinery industries each increased more than five-fold. Increases for
transport equipment and other heavy industries were similar, and the rates of increase were sustained
at least until l979.
Policy instruments quite different from those adopted in the 1960s were used to implement
HCI targets. Individual private sector firms were designated by the government to carry out particular
HCI projects: if those projects were profitable, the firm was also assigned other, less profitable
projects, and subsidies of various kinds were extended to firms undertaking unprofitable
investments. HCI projects were provided with relatively high rates of protection from imports. The
average rate of effective protection for HCI industries is estimated to have been 43.2% in l978,
compared to 3.6% for other manufacturing industries. State-owned b nks were directed to provide
credit to firms undertaking HCI projects at low and often negative real rates of interest, and the share
of allocated credit that went to firms undertaking HCI projects rose from 36% in l973 to 68.4% in
l982. Tax authorities were instructed to treat firms undertaking HCI projects preferentially, in
addition to tax breaks given under the law for HCI projects. It is estimated that HCI industries were
subject to effective corporate tax rates of l6-l9% in the late l970s, contrasted with rates of almost
50% for non-HCI industries. Finally, when difficulties were encountered despi  the heavily
preferential treatment, President Park and his top officials could be counted on for support in a
variety of forms.106
The HCI drive remains controversial, but there is little doubt that there was considerable
waste of resources in the l973-80 period in the HCI drive. A few of the projects were immediately
successful, but many were heavily loss-making. Some of those, after restructuring, were able by the
late l980s to earn a reasonable rate of return. Some new factories remained at very low rates of
capacity utilization for long periods of time. While there were significant differences among HCI
industries, with shipbuilding, for example, relatively much more successful than heavy electrical
machinery, the capital-output ratio rose markedly. Estimating the total return from inception of the
HCI drive to the late l980s would certainly reveal a lower rate than was earned in the more
                                                       
106 The HCI drive, enunciated in the Third Five Year Plan, l972-76 was approved by President Park, and
clearly had his strong backing as well as that of other top policy makers. Stern et al (l995) report that President Park
"rarely wavered in his support even when the project ran into difficulties" for at least five years after the HCI drive
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traditional industries. Yoo (l990, p. 75) estimated rates of return on capital based on international
prices and found that the rate of return for the heavy and chemical industry group was 8.3% in l970,
l4.9% in l975, l7.9% in l978 and l4.8% in l983. By contrast, the entire group of light industries
(which had provided most of Korea's exports and had, indeed, been the leading engine of growth in
the l960s), still earned rates of return of l3.3%, 22.0%, 22.9% and l4.3%. By his other measures as
well, the economic efficiency of the HCI group was less than that of the light industries.
Signs of difficulty began to appear as early as l977. On the one hand, the years of the HCI
drive were accompanied by expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, and inflation was accelerating.
On the other hand, signs also emerged that economic growth was slowing, and that exporters were
encountering greater difficulty. Overall, real GDP growth averaged 7.6% over the l975-80 period
(including the negative 5.2% rate in l980).
On the macroeconomic stability side, after the inflationary burst of l974 had been contained,
the rate of increase of wholesale prices fell each year until l977, when it reached a low of 9.0%
(compared to 6.7% in the last pre-oil ice increase year of l973). Thereafter, the rate of inflation,
as measured by the wholesale price index, rose to 11.6% in l978 and l8.8% in l979. With the impact
of the second oil price increase, the rate of inflation jumped to 38.9% in l980. In large part, this was
attributable to the rapid increase in the rate of investment, which accompanied the HCI drive: overall
investment had risen sharply from 25.3% of GDP in l976 to 36.0% in l979. The government's fiscal
deficit also increased, although it rose only from l.23% of GDP in l978 to 2.23% of GDP in l980
(and rose again in l98l to 3.34% of GDP).
Export growth began slowing down, and exports originating in light industry (including
textiles and apparel, plywood, and other labor-intensive manufactures) actually fell in l979. The
flagging of export growth, and the difficulties encountered by light industries in the last half of the
l970s have also been attributed to the HCI drive. The HCI drive sharply increased the demand for
skilled workers, driving up their earnings relative to those of unskilled workers substantially. For all
manufacturing industries, real wages during the late l970s rose at an average annual rate of ll.6%,
compared to 6% annually in the first half of the decade. Since the labor cost in light industries
represented a higher fraction of the total, their relative cost position undoubtedly deteriorated, quite
aside from the preferential treatment accorded to HCI projects. The current account deficit increased
sharply in response to rapidly rising imports (to meet the investments of the HCI industries) and to
lagging exports. The burgeoning current account deficit reflected the direct demands of the HCI
drive as well as the consequences of failing to maintain the real exchange rate for exporters. The
current account deficits were financed by large capital inflows. Over the l977-8l p iod, net capital
inflows into Korea averaged ll.3% of GDP, contrasted with the already-high 9.3% average capital
inflow over the l973-77 period.
3.4. Consolidation, Stabilization, and Renewed Growth, 1980-85
A first attempt to stabilize the economy was announced in April l979, before the second oil
price increase, as signs of economic difficulty were beginning to emerge from many directions. But
it was only beginning to be implemented when the second oil price increase took place. Shortly
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thereafter, political uncertainties followed President Park's assassination, and it was not until l98l
that corrections began in earnest.
The years l980- 2 were a time during which there was a required adjustment because of
difficulties in the HCI sector, the oil price increase, and the excess demand in the domestic economy
that had arisen because of the HCI drive. The Comprehensive Measures for Economic Stabilization
Program(CMES) had several parts. Monetary and fiscal policy were to be tightened, investment in
heavy and chemical industry adjusted, price stability was to be sought especially for daily necessities,
and real estate speculation was to end. For the heavy and chemical industries, measures were
announced with respect to a significant number of individual industries and projects. These included
consolidation, scaling back of investment plans in light of low-capacity utilization, and otherwise
altering the program. "Realignment" of investment strategies for heavy and chemical industries
included the merging of different companies (for copper smelting, in particular), and a reduction in
the number of firms engaging in a particular activity. After l980, the number of industries designated
to receive preferential treatment under the HCI drive was significantly reduced, and the types of
preferential treatment accorded to them were also cut back. At the same time, macroeconomic policy
was shifted in response to the inflationary pressure, and the exchange rate was altered, reversing the
misalignment that had intensified under the HCI drive. The inflation rate fell from a high of 28% in
l980 to 21% in l98l, 7% in l982, 3.4% in l983, and 2.3 and 2.5% in the subsequent two years.
Likewise, the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP fell continuously from its peak of 8.7%
of GDP in l980 onward, reaching 0.9% of GDP in l985. The years l98l-85 were therefore years of
macroeconomic stabilization.
In addition, the years l980-85 witnessed the virtual abandonment of the specific targeting of
firms and industries, and policy shifted back toward reliance upon uniform incentives. As analyzed
by Kim (l994, p. 350), "In l979, the government began to shift not only its policy emphasis from
growth to stability, but also its industrial policy focus from the previous, industry-specific policies
toward a functional approach. The new government that came into power in l980 reorganized the
system of incentives and financial support to R&D activities and the training of technical manpower,
irrespective of industrial branch. In other words, the government began to reduce its role in industrial
planning and targeting, and attempted to undertake policy reforms to promote competition in
domestic markets." Export growth resumed, and even remained positive in l982, a year when trade
volumes worldwide fell significantly. That growth once again was a major source of output growth,
while import substitution played a much smaller role(although accounting for ll% of the HCI
increase in output). Real GDP growth averaged 6.9% from l98l to l985.
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3.5. Emergence as a Newly Industrialized Country, 1985-1995
By l985, it could reasonably be said that Korea had emerged as an industrialized economy.
Exports had stabilized at around 35% of GDP, Korea was the l3th largest exporter in the world.
Value added in manufacturing accounted for over 25% of GDP, and agriculture's share of GDP had
fallen to l2%. Moreover, macroeconomic variables-especially the inflation rate-had stabilized and
domestic savings risen sharply. Thus, growth after l985 shows less pronounced changes in economic
structure than did growth in earlier years, although it continued at a rapid rate, and structural change
was rapid by the standard of OECD countries. The years l986 to l988 witnessed the emergence of
a sizeable current account surplus. In response to that (and to pressures from the U.S.), import
liberalization accelerated significantly. Kim (l994, p. 338) estimates that the degree of liberalization
from quantitative restrictions rose from 78.2% in l985 to 87.5% by l990. The average rate of legal
tariffs also fell from 26.4% in l985 to l4.l% by l990, with the rate of actual collections remaining at
around 5%. As a result, the overall degree of liberalization is estimated to have risen from 78.7% to
87.6% over 5 years.
The structure of protection in l988 provided high rates of effective protection to agriculture
and the machinery industries, while light industries were subject to the lowest rates of effective
protection. Imports remained at around 35% of GDP, according to IMF data. The import content of
exports rose from 26% in l970 to 38% in l980, but remained at around that level, or slightly less
thereafter. The profile of exports had shifted from that typical of a developing country dependent on
primary commodity exports to that much more like that of industrialized countries. Starting in l96l,
all but one (plywood) of the largest ten exports was a primary commodity. By l970, manufactures
predominated and apparel and clothing were the largest single commodity group for exports,
although electronic products, steel products, plywood, footwear, and metal products also made the
list. By l980, textiles and apparel were decreasing in importance, while electrical machinery, ships,
and synthetic resin products had been added to the list. By l990, electronics had topped textiles and
garments, and automobiles, chemical products, ships, general machinery and steel products each
were among the top ten export categories.
Exports continued to grow rapidly, and by l994 exports reached $96 billion, contrasted with
$30 billion only ten years earlier. However, their relative share in overall GNP stabilized to a
considerable degree, as the rapid growth of exports was only slightly faster than that of GDP. Per
capita GNP had exceeded $8,000 by l994. The ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP and the
savings rate had both risen to well over 30%. Exports and imports each represented about 30% of
GDP. Agriculture's share of GDP had fallen to 7.0%, while manufacturing's share had peaked at over
28% and was 26.9% in l994. The share of heavy and chemical industries in Korea's total
manufacturing had grown markedly, rising from 40.9% in l97l to 54.4% in l98l, and 73.l% in l99l.
Services were growing in relative importance, just as in other industrialized countries.
By the mid-l990s, the Korean economy was far more liberalized than it had been even a
decade earlier, and the role of exports and imports in GDP appeared to have stabilized. Korea had
made the transformation from a poor developing country to a newly industrializing country to a
newly industrialized country, and with that the rate of structural transformation appeared to slow
down somewhat.
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4. The relationship between legal and economic change
The preceding analysis of the development of the Korean law and legal system suggests that
the question of classification of the nature of the law governing the public sector is an extremely
complicated one in terms of its application to the Korean situation. However, the tentative
conclusion may be drawn that in terms of substantive economic laws, it would appear that there has
been a high degree of interaction between the law and economic development. Furthermore, it may
arguably be a uniquely Korean feature that the Korean government intentionally utilized legislation
in achieving its goals of economic development. Nevertheless, the question of whether or not these
legislative activities have had a positive impact on economic development seems to depend on the
subject of the law and the particular time period of Korea's development process during the past
several decades. In some instances, it appears that the law had a positive impact on economic
development, while in others, the law produced mere side-effects. Thus, although it seems evident
that there has been a considerably high level of interaction between substantive economic laws and
economic development as a whole, the Korean team would hesitate in drawing any dry and universal
conclusion as to the direction and nature of the influence of legislative activity on the economy.
We are then faced with the question of whether it is possible to demonstrate a positive
relationship between economic development and the increase in the significance of the role of the
legal and dispute settlement systems over the past few decades. Indeed, it is possible to see from the
above examination that the modernization and development of legal institutions and dispute
settlement systems went hand in hand with economic development. Despite this parallel
development, when compared with substantive economic laws, it is not certain that the
modernization of legal institutions and the legal system in any respect had a direct impact on
economic development. It is not possible to boldly conclude, simply on the basis of data
demonstrating the transformation from a humble legal system in the 1960s to the functional and
effective legal system of the 1990s, that this development have directly contributed to economic
development. This does not imply, however, that we must necessarily conclude that the two are
distinct and unrelated to each other. Rather, it is an acknowledgement that we could not conclusively
assert that the legal system played a leading role in enhancing and directing economic development.
Having said this, let us now briefly review the economic and legal development of Korea in a little
more detail.
The l950s did not witness rapid economic growth. Nor is there well established legal and
institutional arrangements necessary for the government to pursue active development strategy. The
legal infrastructure was not yet systemized. To be sure, Korea had its Constitutional laws and
individual laws, such as the basic intellectual property laws and labor laws which were in existence
in the 1950s, but these laws were ineffective and virtually meaningless. Even the legal institutions
necessary to enforce the laws were not formally set up at that time. Under these circumstances, it was
inconceivable to derive an industrial policy that would prepare for the future restructuring of
industries. In that sense, the law was virtually irrelevant to the economy, and vice versa. Moreover,
it seems difficult to relate legal change to economic change, either positively or negatively, as there
was no significant and distinguishable move for legal change during this period.
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The Constitution of 1948 had certain implications regarding the new republic's economic
system: first, it should fundamentally be a free and democratic system; second, social welfare should
be maximized and the state can intervene, if necessary; third, agricultural land should in principle
be owned by farmers and the agricultural land reform is called for; fourth, state ownership or public
management of enterprises is to be expanded; fifth, labor rights are to be protected and workers
should be allowed their share of profits. In addition to these constitutional principles, many laws
were enacted to lay down the institutional groundwork of a market economy, they included laws to
establish the central bank and state-run enterprises, tax laws, capital market laws, etc. Most of these
laws were in general either modeled closely after their Japanese counterparts or copied from modern
US laws which were not in harmony with the Korean legal, economic and cultural systems. Even if
the laws did exist, law enforcement agencies did not apply the laws effectively.
While the government tried to foster the development of business firms and industries,
efforts were rather indirect and government intervention in the economy was kept at a minimum
level. The basic policy stance was to minimize the intervention of the government and pursue a
laissez-faire type of free market economy. But the Korean economy in the 1950s was far from being
a market economy. After the devastating war, there were neither consumers, producers, nor any
markets. The ability to manage the economy and to run the industries and business firms was badly
needed, and the government was considered the most appropriate means for meeting these demands.
But the government failed to provide legal apparatus to aggressively correct market failures.
There is little doubt that both the distribution of land via the land reform program in 1947
and the reform of the educational system enabled more rapid growth than would otherwise have been
possible, but it took other policy changes to seize the potential offered by these reforms. The disposal
of reverted properties combined with land reform resulted in the collapse of the landlord class and
the emergence of new commercial or industrial capital. The establishment of a new government
following the military coup in 1960 was accompanied by a shift in policy with the government
placing top priority on achieving economic growth and establishing a leading governmental role in
economic activity. The strong commitment of the government to economic development, the
nationalization of several industries, the control of all the financial and fiscal policy tools, and short
and long-term plans all helped the government direct economic activities.
Since the inauguration of President Park, intense legislative activities took place together
with the making of new and ambitious government-driven conomic plans. In the early 1960s, basic
substantive laws were enacted or rewritten in the form of amendments to old laws. For instance, the
Civil Code-including the laws of contract, property, securities, tort and domestic relations-was
enacted in 1961. Until then, Korea had borrowed the Japanese Civil Code. A number of major
economic laws were enacted or substantially amended so as to enable effective enforcement and to
reflect the Korea-specific legal and economic environment. For instance, major labor laws were
substantially amended between 1961 and 1963, and the law to induce foreign investment was first
enacted in 1960.
The laws and legal institutions established by the 1960s were instrumental in achieving
economic success. In the early half of the 1960s, many state-allocative and fairly discretionary laws
were enacted which brought about fundamental policy changes, geared largely to supporting the
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outer-oriented growth strategy. These laws were applied in a non-discriminating manner without bias
towards any specific group of industries or firms. Significant reforms in trade and exchange policy
led to rapid growth, which continued uninterrupted until the early 1970s, particularly in the area of
labor-intensive exports. Many laws were enacted to institutionalize and implement industrial policies
to achieve rapid growth of exports and industries. It may therefore be said that legal changes induced
economic growth during the 1960s and beyond, in light of the role the outer-oriented trad  strategy
played in facilitating economic growth.
It is noteworthy that the export drive in the 1960s created an environment in which the
exporting firms continued to face competitive threats in the export markets and had to improve their
efficiency in order to survive. Although most of the domestic markets were protected from foreign
competition as well as domestic competition, the export drive alone must have contributed to
augmenting efficiency and to the rapid growth of the manufacturing sector. In microeconomic terms,
the export drive meant that the individual industries and firms tried to overcome the limitations of
a small domestic market by creating demand abroad and thus achieving economies of scale in their
production. The creation of demand in the export markets is not without conditions and efficiency
improvements must have existed in this competitive process.
The relationship between the state and the market saw a new swing in the 1960s. As
liberalism and inactivity of the government in the 1950s proved to be ineffective, the new
administration first tried to establish a leading role of the government in the economy, which
signaled the beginning of a "government-the l ader, business-the follower" relationship in Korea.
As the situation persisted for two decades, the dominant position of the government as the
problem-solver became even stronger.
State-owned and managed enterprises are an extreme form of government regulation. The
rapid expansion of public enterprises in Korea in the 1960s and 1970s could be understood in the
context of prevailing belief of an omnipotent government in those years. In addition to the textbook
explanation of the raison d'etre of public enterprises, such as natural monopoly and externality,
public enterprises in developing countries are justified when the input markets suffer from serious
imperfections. Korea in the 1960s and 1970s was no exception in this regard, and the markets for
capital, labor, and entrepreneurship, were all suffering from market failures. It was widely believed
that the government could promote the development of key industries by establishing public
enterprises.
Nationalization of banks was carried out for a different reason, to control the supply of credit,
since it was essential to the government's management of the economy. Once most industries
including banks were nationalized, they contributed to consolidating the economic power of the
government through the direct ownership and control of the industries. In addition to the banking
sector, such social infrastructure as electricity, telecommunication, roads, railways, port facilities and
such key industries as fertilizers, oil refineries, and steel were all owned and controlled by the
government, which consolidated the economic power of the government vis-a-vis the private sector
in the 1960s and 1970s.
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The 1970s witnessed a significant shift in policy, with the implementation of laws designed
to promote specific industries, particularly Heavy and Chemical Industries(HCI). This governmental
policy decision in relation to the HCI drive was first implemented in the form of legislative activity.
The government enacted several laws to promote key export-target d industries, thereby providing
the cornerstone for a subsequent governmental push towards an export-oriented conomic policy.
These laws were highly discretionary and in many cases the subject of arbitrary implementation. In
many cases, government officials could arbitrarily select specific sectors of industries or firms to be
given government-conferred advantages or privileges. However, in the later 1970s, these laws were
amended, which transformed their nature from discretionary law to rule-based law, albeit the law
tended to remain highly state-allocative. Nevertheless, although these laws enabled the government
to strongly pursue an export-oriented strategic economic policy, due to their originally political
bureaucratic nature, these laws produced several adverse side-effects on th  Korean economy. There
were distortions caused by the concentration of investments in HCIs: the neglect of light industries
sacrificed their growth potential; some of the government-led investments in HCIs turned out to be
inefficient, leading to the subsequent realignment of investments and rationalization measures in the
1980s; the industrial organization dominated by the chaebol was also consolidated due to the HCI
drive.
During the 1970s, the government also tightened control over economic activities at the
private level by means of the law. Laws regarding price stabilization and labor were enacted to
facilitate extensive governmental intervention many areas of private business to suppress any private
activities which might hinder the export-oriented policy. While legislation with respect to price
control and labor produced negative side-effects in these two fields, laws regarding such areas as
capital inducement resulted in positive effects on economic growth.
From 1975 to 1979 in the aftermath of the oil crisis, the government further tightened its grip
on the economy by adopting widespread price controls. Hit by the first oil crisis, the country suffered
heavily from a sharp increase in the price of imported raw materials, experiencing high rate of
inflation and demand-supply imbalance in a large number of already distorted markets. As an effort
to cope with this problem, the "Act Concerning Price Stabilization and Fair Trade" was passed in
1975, and the government monitored and intervened in individual product markets under the Act.
Extensive price regulation of about 150 monopolistic or ligopolistic products was carried out every
year until 1979. In addition, a price ceiling was placed, at the beginning on coal briquettes, and,
between 1977 and 1978, on more than 20 items of daily necessity. The Act had two objectives of
price control and assurance of fair trade practices, but the actual implementation was focused on
price control and prohibition of the hoarding and cornering of staple food products.
Direct price control on a wide range of commodities, however, went beyond the limit of
administrative capacity and entailed a series of problems and negative side effects. Long lasting price
controls severely hampered the price mechanism and gave rise to phenomena such as dual pricing
and deterioration of the product quality as well as chronic excess demand. This direct governmental
intervention in private business activities can also be found in the area of labor law. During the
1970s, the government endeavored to suppress any private activities which might hinder the
export-oriented economic policy. Accordingly, in carrying out this objective, the government
suppressed the labor movement. Again, law made this possible.
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In contrast to this, other cases reflect the positive effects that legal change had on Korean
economic growth, without expensive opportunity costs to labor groups or others. For instance, the
1973 amendment to the Foreign Capital Inducement Act of 19% contributed very much to an
increase in foreign capital as well as foreign direct investment under very favorable conditions. This
enabled Korean firms to implement large-scale investment in key industries, and consequently
contributed to the economic growth of Korea. Subsequently, new laws and policies were formulated
and implemented in the 1980s in an effort to strengthen the functions of the market mechanism and
to cure the imperfections found in the government's management of the economy. These included,
among others, trade liberalization, competition law and policy, deregulation, and privatization, thus
indicating a more outer oriented trade strategy with uniform incentives.
Although the government-driven development strategy often produced the desired outcome,
it invariably was accompanied by adverse side effects and market distortions which grew more
serious as the economy expanded and became increasingly complex. Due to industrial and banking
policies that favorably treated large firms to realize scale economies, activities of small-and
medium-sized firms were stunted and economic power became concentrated. With conglomerates
expanding and diversifying their business activities, the monopolistic structure of the market
deepened and restrictive business practices became more common and widespread. The growth-first
policy also widened the imbalance among industries, regions, and income classes. By the end of the
l970s, it was apparent that growth was slowing down and that the economy was beginning to
encounter significant bottlenecks and obstacles to sustaining growth.
The 1980s witnessed a series of new laws and policies to strengthen the functions of the
market mechanism and to cure the imperfections found in the government's management of the
economy. These include trade liberalization, competition law and policy, deregulation and
privatization of public enterprises. Major laws relating to industrial policy promoting key industries
were amended so as to lessen the degree of government intervention. In other words, the government
attempted to deregulate key industries which had previously been under the umbrella of direct
government control. The labor laws were also amended to increase the level of protection of workers'
rights. This was mandated by the new Constitution of 1980. Thus, many restrictions on workers'
rights and the labor movement were legally lifted, although the labor movement itself was politically
suppressed.
One of the most important legal changes that occurred in the early 1980s was the enactment
of the law relating to competition. In December of 1980, the government enacted "the Monopoly
Regulation and Fair Trade Act". This law was designed not only to promote free and fair competition
in the market by regulating anti-competitive business activities, but also to mitigate the economic
concentration ratio in the overall economy. It signifies a fundamental shift in policy orientation,
marking a beginning of departure from the government-led economy prevailing up to the 1970s to
a full-fledged market economy based on creative activities of the private sector and free competition.
It is also noticeable that the Consumer Protection Act was enacted in the same year as the
competition law. Industry-specific laws and regulations were merged into the Industrial Development
Act. And industrial laws of general applicability such as the Copyright Act and the Patent Act were
modified and strengthened and actively enforced.
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It is possible to think of the new government policies adopted in the early 1980s as pursuing
distributional justice, stabilization, liberalization and deregulation, as countervailing measures to
mitigate the side-effects resulting from the previous export/growth-oriented economic policy
prevailing throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In this sense, we can say that in the 1960s law led
economic policy. This was continued during the 1970s, when the law was strengthened to further
support and implement the export-oriented economic policy. Meanwhile, the Korean economy
encountered serious side-effects as a result of this export/growth-oriented economic policy.
Accordingly, the law again took charge in the 1980s to cure this economic disease.
It would be fair to say that these changes in legal and policy regimes were brought about by
economic changes up to 1980. The rapid growth of firms and industries both in number and size was
what broadened the industrial base. While broadening their base, industries in Korea experienced
a very rapid restructuring. The industrial base expansion and the rapid industrial restructuring were
accompanied by structural changes in the market. On average, each market became populated with
a greater number of competitors, leading to a more competitive market structure and to an increased
amount of actual or potential competition. The fact that the industrial development in the 1960s and
1970s witnessed the rapid growth of firms and industries, the emergence of many new markets, the
expansion of entrepreneurship and increasing pressures of competition, implies that certain
fundamental driving forces of the market mechanism began to foster in the Korean economy.
Although the economy was still under strong government control, these forces began forming a main
trend in substituting the role of the government.
By the 1990s, Korea achieved a certain degree of economic stabilization, and it was at this
time that attempts were made to modernize the entire Korean legal and economic system in an effort
to reach the level of advanced countries. In respect of the legal arena, it is possible to identify many
legislative activities which were undertaken in the endeavor to upgrade the quality of the laws. In
terms of economic activity, the government further deregulated and liberalized the economy, and
opened domestic markets up to foreign firms. As the economy grew more complicated, the once
significant role of the government began to decline and a market mechanism began to replace the
state. This gradual process of the market substituting for the state has taken place. It is fair to say that
the 1980s and 1990s have been a period during which the traditional predominance of the state over
the market, represented by regulations, protections and supports, was actively interacting with new
forces of the market, represented by trade liberalization, competition, deregulation and privatization.
Economic growth in the 1980s was accompanied by an unprecedented growth in the size and
number of industries, which far surpassed the industrial growth in the 1960s and 1970s. In the
manufacturing sector alone, the number of establishments increased from 30,823 in 1980 to 74,679
in 1992, and the total number of shipments increased fourfold during the same period (46 trillion
won in 1980 and 179 trillion won in 1992, all in 1985 prices). Since the mid-1980s, liberalization
was on the agenda in trade talks with Korea's major trade partners, especially the U.S. Demands of
trade partners for further liberalization of imports and investment began to affect Korea's trade and
investment policies and accelerated market opening. It is also significant that, during this period,
Korea became exposed to pressure from abroad to initiate changes in her legal system in order to
conform with international agreements, such as the WTO Agreement. In light of the fact that Korea
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became a member of the OECD in summer, 1996, Korea is required to change the major economic
laws to bring them in line with those of the other OECD countries.
One of the clearest examples of this trend may be found in the field of intellectual property
(IP) law. Until 1986, when Korea virtually rewrote the entire system of IP laws in response to
pressure from the US, the Korean authorities did little to enforce laws relating to intellectual
property. However, both the Korean domestic industries as well as foreign countries, demanded
greater protection of IPR in Korea. This is due to the fact that domestic industries themselves
recognized the need for effective IP laws in order to protect their own IPRs, and further
acknowledged the fact that, without adequate protection of IPRs, Korea would not be able to induce
high-technology industries from abroad, which had become essential to the process of reviving the
Korean economy. In this respect, it is possible to say that the changing economic environment
spurred legal change in the area of intellectual property rights.
The reverse is also true. Since the 1987 amendment to the old Patent Act, the Korean
pharmaceutical industry has invested largely in R&D, resulting in the growth of the domestic
industry. In addition, effective protection of copyrights under the new Copyright Act has led to the
rapid growth of the domestic publishing industry. The newly enacted Computer Program Protection
Act of 1987 also enabled the domestic software industry to prosper in a short period. In the late
1980s, all of the major labor laws were also significantly amended to enhance the level of protection
of workers' rights. Although the subject of criticism from both employers and employees, the
government nevertheless attempted to be neutral as between the two sides. In respect of labor law,
it can be observed that the previous government policies of a growth-oriented economy and the
suppression of workers' rights triggered a political turning point, represented by the 1987 June 29
Declaration of Democratic Reform. In this case, therefore, this political change resulted in the
successful legal reform of labor laws.
In 1986, the Engineering Industry Promotion Act was passed, superseding the seven previous
individual laws relating to the promotion of specific export-target industries. This law was recently
further amended to conform with Korea's obligations under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures. The law relating to foreign investment is not an exception to this process
of legal reform. In the middle 1980s, the FCIA was virtually rewritten in accordance with the new
government policy of liberalization.
This brief examination of economic and legal developments in Korea during the past three
decades demonstrates that the question of whether or not legislative activities had a positive impact
on economic development depends on whether the focus is on the subject-mat er of th  law or the
particular time period. In some instances, it appears that the law had a positive impact on economic
development, while in others, the laws merely produced negative side-eff cts in the economy. Thus,
while the high level of interaction between substantive economic laws and economic development
in general is indisputable, it is difficult to come to an all- ncomp ssing conclusion with respect to
the positive or otherwise influence of legislative activity on economic development.
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In the area of legal institutions and the dispute settlement system, it does not appear clear that
there has been an obviously positive relationship between economic development and the increase
in the significance of the role of the legal and dispute settlement systems over the past few decades.
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Table 8: Exports and Imports in Korea, 1960 - 19 4
Export Import Export Import
Year
(millions of US $)
Rate of Growth
of Export (%)
(% of GDP)
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
 
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
 
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
 
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
 
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
 
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
   32
   41
   55
   87
   119
  
   175
   250
   320
   455
   622
   835
  1,068
  1,624
  3,225
  4,460
  5,081
  7,715
 10,047
 12,711
 15,055
  
 17,505
 21,254
 21,853
 24,445
 29,245
 30,283
 34,715
 47,281
 60,697
 62,377
 65,016
 71,870
 76,632
 82,236
 96,013
 344
 316
 422
 560
 404
 
 463
 716
 996
   1,463
   1,824
 
   1,984
   2,394
   2,522
   4,240
   6,852
 
   7,274
   8,774
  10,811
  14,972
  20,339
 
  22,292
  26,131
  24,251
  26,192
  30,631
 
  31,136
  31,584
  41,020
  51,811
  61,465
 
  69,844
  81,525
  81,775
  83,800
  102,348
   60
   28
   37
   55
   36
  
   47
   45
   28
   42
   37
  
   34
   28 
   52 
   98 
   39 
  
   11 
   56 
   30 
   27 
   18 
  
   16 
   21 
   3 
   12 
   20 
  
   4 
   15 
   36 
   28 
   3 
  
   4 
   11 
   7 
   7 
   17 
   3
   5
   5
   5
   6
   9
  10
  11
  13
  14
  14
  15
  20
  29
  27
  28
  32
  32
  30
  28
  34
  37
  34
  35
  35
  34
  38
  40
  38
  33
  30
  28
  29
  29
  30
  13
  15
  17
  16
  14
  16
  20
  22
  26
  25
  24
  26
  24
  32
  39
  36
  33
  32
  33
  35
  41
  42
  37
  36
  35
  33
  32
  32
  30
  30
  30
  31
  30
  29
  31
 Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, September, 1995 (CD-ROM).
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Table 9: Indicators of Structural Shifts in the Korean Economy
Indicater 1953 1961 1971 1981 1991 1994
1.GNP (in 100 mil US$) 14 21 95 671 2920 3769
2.Per capita GNP
 (in US$)
67.0 82.0 289.0 1741.0 6757.0 8483.0
3.Gross Domestic
 Investment Ratio
14.7 12.0 24.8 29.9 39.1 36.1
4.Gross Savings Ratio 13.1 11.7 16.1 22.9 36.1 35.2
5.Ratio of Exports to
 GNP
3.2 6.3 16.1 37.9 28.8 30.1
6.Ratio of Imports to
 GNP
9.8 14.9 26.5 47.0 32.0 30.9
7.Productiion Structure
 1)Agrictural,
  Forestry, Fishing
 2)Manufacturing
 3)Services
47.3
9.0
42.6
39.1
13.6
45.4
27.2
21.1
45.5
15.5
28.5
54.4
7.7
28.5
63.3
7.0
26.9
65.8
8.Manufacturing Structure
 1)Light Industry
 2)Heavy and Chemical
  Industry
78.9
26.3
73.7
40.4
59.6
54.4
45.6
68.3
31.7
73.1
26.9
 Source: Data provided by Dr. Jungho Yoo.
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Table 10: Growth in Korean Economy, 1960 - 19 5
Growth Rate of Real GDP
(base : 1990)
Per Capita GNP
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1.2
5.9
2.1
9.1
9.7
5.7
12.2
5.9
11.3
13.8
8.8
85
4.8
12.8
8.1
6.6
11.8
10.3
9.4
7.1
-2.7
6.2
7.6
11.5
8.7
6.5
11.6
11.5
11.3
6.4
9.5
9.1
5.1
5.8
8.6
9.0
79
82
87
100
103
105
125
142
169
210
253
289
319
396
541
594
802
1011
1400
1647
1597
1741
1834
2014
2187
2242
2568
3218
4295
5210
5883
6757
7007
7513
8483
-
